Enabling Responsible Public Genomics by Conley, John M. et al.
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 20 | Issue 2
2012
Enabling Responsible Public Genomics
John M. Conley
Adam K. Doerr
Daniel B. Vorhaus
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
John M. Conley, Adam K. Doerr, and Daniel B. Vorhaus, Enabling Responsible Public Genomics, 20 Health Matrix 325 (2010)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol20/iss2/4
ENABLING RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC
GENOMICS
John M Conley, Adam K. Doerr, and Daniel B. Vorhaust
ABSTRACT
As scientific understandings of genetics advance, researchers re-
quire increasingly rich datasets that combine genomic data from large
numbers of individuals with medical and other personal information.
Linking individuals' genetic data and personal information precludes
anonymity and produces medically significant information - a result
not contemplated by the established legal and ethical conventions
governing human genomic research. To pursue the next generation of
human genomic research and commerce in a responsible fashion,
scientists, lawyers, and regulators must address substantial new issues,
including researchers' duties with respect to clinically significant data,
the challenges to privacy presented by genomic data, the boundary
between genomic research and commerce, and the practice of medi-
cine.
This Article presents a new model for understanding and address-
ing these new challenges - a "public genomics" premised on the idea
that ethically, legally, and socially responsible genomics research re-
quires openness, not privacy, as its organizing principle. Responsible
public genomics combines the data contributed by informed and fully
consenting information altruists and the research potential of rich da-
tasets in a genomic commons that is freely and globally available.
This Article examines the risks and benefits of this public genomics
t John M. Conley is a William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and of counsel to the law firm of Robinson,
Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. Adam K. Doerr and Daniel B. Vorhaus are attorneys at
Robinson, Bradshaw, publisher of the Genomics Law Report, http://www
.genomicslawreport.com/. Robinson, Bradshaw has represented the Personal Genome
Project and PersonalGenomes.org, and Daniel B. Vorhaus currently serves as an ELSI
advisor to the Personal Genome Project, including with respect to its informed con-
sent agreements.
The authors wish to thank participants in a seminar at Duke University's
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model in the context of an ambitious genetic research project currently
under way - the Personal Genome Project. This Article also (i) de-
monstrates that large-scale genomic projects are desirable, (ii) eva-
luates the risks and challenges presented by public genomics research,
and (iii) determines that the current legal and regulatory regimes re-
strict beneficial and responsible scientific inquiry while failing to ade-
quately protect participants. The Article concludes by proposing a
modified normative and legal framework that embraces and enables a
future of responsible public genomics.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1909, Danish biologist Wilhelm Johanssen suggested the term
"gene" to describe the (then-conceptual) mechanism by which inhe-
rited traits passed from parent to offspring. A century's worth of
research has revealed that the gene - a stretch of both coding and non-
coding DNA sequences - is indeed the primary biochemical mechan-
ism of inheritance. This research has also revealed that the traditional
understanding of genetic inheritance as a direct linkage between a
single gene and a single trait is, for the vast majority of traits, simplis-
tic and incomplete.' Instead, most gene-trait relationships appear to
be complex and frequently inexplicable by today's knowledge,2 re
quiring geneticists to continue to attempt to unravel the tangled path-
ways between genes and traits by developing new research, theories,
and analytical tools.' Many geneticists look forward to a second
century of genomic research that they hope will enable personalized
medical guidance to be offered to patients and consumers, based on
genetic factors, long before the manifestation of disease.
Genomics thrives on data. Data sets that combine genomic and
trait data, including medical histories and environmental measure-
ments, are the lifeblood of genomic research. To continue exploring
the pathways by which a genome4 is ultimately manifest as a unique
human being, researchers require increasingly rich and large-scale
datasets. Until quite recently, amassing such datasets was impossible
because of inadequate technology and prohibitive costs. The original
1 See, e.g., Jose L. Badano & Nicholas Katsanis, Beyond Mendel: An Evolv-
ing View of Human Genetic Disease Transmission, 3 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS
779, 779 (2002).
2 See, e.g., David Botstein & Neil Risch, Discovering Genotypes Underlying
Human Phenotypes: Past Successes for Mendelian Disease, Future Approaches for
Complex Disease, 33 NATURE GENETICS 228 (2003).
3 In addition to traditional Mendelian inheritance, research is investigating
the role of common and rare genetic variants, coding and non-coding regions and
structural variation within the genome, and a host of other factors.
4 The term "genome" refers to the entire human genome, a copy of which is
contained within the nucleus of every cell in the body. The human genome is com-
prised of roughly 3 billion base pairs. The term "gene," which refers to an identified
portion of the genome, consists of a stretch of protein-coding and non-coding regions.
Genes vary greatly in size, and there are thought to be 20,000 to 25,000 genes in the
genome, which represents approximately one and a half percent of the entire human
genome. For purposes of this Article, we use the term "genome" to refer to research
and commerce that investigates the structure and function of human genomic data
including - but not limited to - the role that genes and genetic inheritance plays in
determining human traits.
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effort to sequence a complete human genome took more than a decade
and cost several billion dollars. In recent years, however, the cost of
genomic sequencing has declined precipitously, spurred by scientific
and technological advances that seem likely to render genomic se-
quencing a commodity within the next ten years, if not much sooner.
This decline in genomic sequencing costs means that researchers will
soon be able to generate the massive amounts of information that
large-scale genomic research requires. Developing the technological
capacity to generate these rich datasets at affordable costs overcomes
the scientific obstacle, but it inevitably results - as have other disrup-
tive advances, from railroads to the Internet - in the creation of new
legal and social challenges. This Article focuses on three such chal-
lenges: the difficulty of guaranteeing privacy, the clinical significance
of genomic information, and the difficulty of obtaining truly "in-
formed" consent.
By combining individuals' genomic data with their personal in-
formation - medical history, physical traits, diet, lifestyle, and envi-
ronmental exposures - researchers will be able to create integrated
datasets to analyze the complete range of factors that contribute to
complex human traits and conditions. As the American Society of
Human Genetics has recognized, however, such datasets implicate
substantial privacy issues.6 Correlating genotypic and phenotypic
information in the same database creates "an accurate and unique
identifier"7 that makes it difficult to guarantee participants that their
data will remain private. Further, longitudinal studies, which enable
researchers to track participant traits, exposures, and outcomes over
time, require that researchers must be able to identify and interact with
participants to update personal and health information. Thus, unlike
many human research projects, where the nature of the research per-
mits or even requires participant anonymity, the structural features
5 See MARK GUYER & ADAM FELSENFELD, NAT'L HUMAN GENOME
RESEARCH INST., NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, THE FUTURE OF GENOME SEQUENCING,
http://www.genome.gov/27529702 (last visited May 3, 2010).
6 Joann Boughman, Am. Soc'y of Human Genetics, ASHG Response to
NIH on Genome-Wide Association Studies, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.ashg.org/
pages/statementnov3006.shtmi.
Id.
8 For example, clinical trials for the development of many pharmaceutical
products utilize double-blind studies, "[a] clinical trial design in which neither the
participating individuals nor the study staff knows which participants are receiving
the experimental drug and which are receiving a placebo (or another therapy).
Double-blind trials are thought to produce objective results, since the expectations of
the doctor and the participant about the experimental drug do not affect the outcome
.... ClinicTrials.gov, Glossary of Clinical Trials Terms, http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/
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and the success of large-scale and long-term genomic research dictate
a different, less anonymous model.
Complicating matters further, an individual's genomic informa-
tion often contains clinically actionable information - information that
could lead subjects to seek specific testing or treatment based on their
genetic makeup. Not only is the significance of this genomic data,
and the appropriate clinical response, often not well-understood by
patients and providers alike, it is constantly evolving as new scientific
discoveries are made and new gene-trait associations are advanced.
As a result, participants may feel pressed to act on genomic data in the
face of incomplete information as to the advisability or efficacy of the
treatment they pursue (or forego).
Similarly, researchers must make difficult decisions regarding
how much and what type of information to share with participants.
Should researchers be obliged to share everything? Should there be
some sort of cutoff to distinguish information with established medi-
cal value from preliminary findings? If so, who should determine
where the line falls? Regardless of how the balance is struck, some
participants will be dissatisfied - to say nothing of the challenge pre-
sented in interpreting such data, including where the burden of inter-
pretation should fall.
Finally, ensuring that subjects provide truly informed consent to
participate in large-scale genomic research projects presents serious
challenges. A deep understanding of the underlying science of ge-
nomics is critical to informed consent - a high bar. Finding sufficient
numbers of knowledgeable participants,9 although challenging, is not
even the most significant issue related to informed consent. The
greater difficulty lies in the genomic unknowns, as it is impossible to
inform participants about benefits, risks, and implications that the
researchers themselves do not fully understand. What does it mean to
require an individual to provide informed consent when the signific-
ance of genomic data changes with each new discovery?
These challenges of genomic research - the inability to guarantee
privacy, the clinical significance of genomic information, and the dif-
ficulty of obtaining truly informed consent - must be resolved to pur-
sue the next generation of human genomic research and commerce in
an ethically and legally responsible fashion. This Article offers a
info/glossary (last visited May 3, 2010).
9 The challenge is to locate not only a sufficient number of participants that
have an adequate understanding of genomics in order to provide informed consent,
but to do so in a way that produces a representative sample population. A research
cohort consisting entirely of English-speaking genetics professors will be of limited
value for obvious reasons.
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novel approach to the host of emerging legal and ethical questions
surrounding the next generation of genomic research: a revised nor-
mative and legal framework for the pursuit of "public genomics" that
is premised on the idea that ethically, legally, and socially responsible
genomic research requires openness, not privacy, as its organizing
principle. To be both responsible and effective, large-scale genomic
research should take place in full view of the public and the law,
adopting openness in risk disclosure and informed consent, extensive
dialogue and data-sharing among researchers and participants, and
thoughtful self-regulation.
This Article details how public genomics projects may be con-
ducted in an ethically, legally, and socially responsible fashion and
what features of the current legal, regulatory, and normative landscape
may need to be adjusted in order to enable such research. This Article
also examines the risks and benefits of the public genomics model,
using as an example the Personal Genome Project (PGP), a project
sponsored by Harvard Medical School which aims to establish a pub-
licly available, fully consented dataset containing comprehensive ge-
notypic, phenotypic, and personal information of 100,000 participants.
Part I reviews the present state of genomic science and research,
concludes that large-scale genomic research projects are achievable
and desirable, and delineates the core characteristics of the "public
genomics" model. Part II delves deeper into the risks and challenges
presented by public genomics research, including: (i) the feasibility
and desirability of conducting anonymized or confidential genomics
research; (ii) the implications of informed consent given a rapidly
evolving knowledge base; and (iii) the difficulty of distinguishing
between research and clinical activities. Part III assesses the current
legal and regulatory scheme applicable to public genomics and deter-
mines that it is presently inadequate to meet the objective of protect-
ing individual research participants while simultaneously enabling
responsible and promising scientific inquiry. Finally, the Article arti-
culates the key principles and characteristics of a new legal and nor-
mative regime that would advance these objectives far more effective-
ly than the current morass of state and federal statutes, regulations,
and common law decisions.
I. THE PATH TO PUBLIC GENOMICS
The path to public genomics began even before the official launch
of the Human Genome Project in 1990, an extraordinarily ambitious
and publicly funded attempt to develop and publish a complete road-
map of the human genome. The widely publicized - and, at the time,
widely criticized - venture saw an international consortium of gov-
330 [Vol. 20:325
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ernment agencies and research centers'0 produce a "rough draft" of
the consensus human genome in 2000, followed by a "final draft" in
2003. This historic achievement - the genomics moonshot - is well
chronicled," and the sheer magnitude of the undertaking is often con-
veyed by reference to the tremendous time and budget of the project:
more than a decade and nearly three billion dollars.12
The pace of technological and scientific innovation has signifi-
cantly accelerated since the Human Genome Project's completion,
enabling the construction of several large-scale human genomic data-
bases designed to build upon the Human Genome Project's work."
10 See Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., Nat'l Insts. of Health, The Hu-
man Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.genome
.gov/1 1006943 (last visited May 3, 2010).
11 See generally KEVIN DAVIES, CRACKING THE HUMAN GENOME: INSIDE THE
RACE TO UNLOCK HUMAN DNA (2001) (providing an historical explanation of the
human genome project); JAMES SHREEVE, THE GENOME WAR: How CRAIG VENTER
TRIED TO CAPTURE THE CODE OF LIFE AND SAVE THE WORLD (2004).
12 See Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., supra note 10. For a more de-
tailed budget and timeline, see Human Genome Project Info., Human Genome Project
Budget, http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human Genome/project/budget.shtml
(last visited May 3, 2010). Less attention-grabbing is the fact that, despite significant
opposition and a reliance on technologies that were far from fully developed when the
project commenced, the Human Genome Project was completed ahead of schedule
and under budget, the result of an unexpectedly rapid development in the underlying
genomic sequencing science and technology. See Nat'l Insts. of Health, Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Human Genome Project: Fact Sheet, http://www.nih.gov/
about/researchresultsforthepublic/HumanGenomeProject.pdf (last visited May 3,
2010).
13 The rate of change has not slowed in the months following the completion
of this Article. Since this article was written, sequencing costs have further declined
and commercial and clinical offerings have continued to expand. For instance,
between the summer of 2009 and the spring of 2010, (i) the number of genetic tests
for diseases reported by GeneTests rose from 1,790 to 1,975 and (ii) the cost of
commercial whole-genome sequencing continued to decline, with Illumina and Life
Technologies introducing new sequencing machines that offer whole-genomes at or
below the $10,000 threshold (this is a "materials only" cost). See infra note 29; see
also GeneTests, Growth of Laboratory Directory, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
projects/GeneTests/static/whatsnew/labdirgrowth.shtml (last visited May 3, 2010);
see Dan Vorhaus, Life Technologies Fires Latest Sequencing Salvo, GENOMICS
L. REP., http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/01/28/life-technolo
gies-fires-latest-sequencing-salvo/ (last visited May 3, 2010). Nor have genomic
research projects remained static. As discussed below, the PGP has submitted a
revised protocol and informed consent agreement reflecting comments from IRB
members, participants and other advisors, including this Article's authors. See infra
note 97. Despite the rate and breadth of changes in the scientific and commercial
areas of genomics, the social, legal, and regulatory challenges addressed by this
Article - particularly the expanding role of public genomic research and the need to
conduct such research in a responsible fashion - remain substantively unchanged.
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International efforts, including the International HapMap Project14 and
the 1000 Genomes Project,' 5 continue to dramatically increase the
level of detail and sensitivity of available human genome reference
data, expanding upon the limited consensus genome produced by the
Human Genome Project. Other projects, such as the UK Biobank,"
are attempting to categorize genomic variation within geographically
delimited populations.17 Still others aggregate the results from tar-
geted genome-wide association studies that seek the genetic bases of
specific diseases and other complex human traits.' 8  A host of new
14 See Nat'l Ctr. Biotech. Info., U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., Interna-
tional HapMap Project, http://www.hapmap.org (last visited May 3, 2010). Begun in
2002, the International HapMap Project produced a haplotype map of the human
genome. Haplotypes refer to sections of DNA on particular chromosomes that are
typically inherited in blocks. This map helped produce a rough catalogue of common
human genetic variation (those occurring in at least five percent of the population).
Id.
15 The 1000 Genomes Project, launched in 2008, builds on the International
HapMap Project and aims to establish a much more detailed catalogue (variations
occurring in at least one percent of the population) of human genetic variation by
sequencing complete genomes for approximately twelve hundred individuals, with the
resulting genome map to be "made swiftly available to the worldwide scientific com-
munity through freely accessible public databases." 1000 Genomes Project: A Deep
Catalog of Human Genetic Variation, Project Overview, http://www.1000genomes
.org/page.php?page=about (last visited May 3, 2010).
16 Biobank, Welcome to UK Biobank, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/ (last
visited May 3, 2010).
17 A number of other regional or national genomic biobanks have been pro-
posed, and several have even proceeded to the point of producing data. See, e.g.,
Henry T. Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale Ge-
nomic Biobanks, 8 ANN. REv. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 343, 348 (2007).
1 Both the Human Genome Epidemiology Network (HuGENet), part of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Office of Public Health Genom-
ics and the National Human Genome Research Institute's (NHGRI) Office of Popula-
tion Genomics maintain databases tracking published GWA studies, with HuGENet
reporting 335 GWA studies since 2001 and NHGRI identifying 306 as of May 6,
2009. Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., Nat'l Insts. of Health, Potential Etiologic
and Functional Implications of Genome-Wide Association Loci for Human Disease
and Traits, http://www.genome.gov/gwastudies/ (last visited May 3, 2010). These
numbers are rising almost daily. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Human
Genome Epidemiology Network, http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/hugenet/default.htm
(last visited May 3, 2010); Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., Nat'l Insts. of
Health, A Catalog of Published Genome-Wide Association Studies, http://www
.genome.gov/26525384 (last visited May 3, 2010); HuGE Navigator, HuGE
Literature Finder, http://www.hugenavigator.net/HuGENavigator/searchSummary
.do?firstQuery=gwa&publitSearchType-now&whichContinue=firststart&check-n
&dbType=publit&Mysubmit-go (last visited May 3, 2010) (HuGENet reporting 335
GWA studies since 2001).
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large-scale genomic research projects recently established or under
consideration' 9 indicates that the rapid pace of development will con-
tinue.
The proliferation of large-scale genomic databases exhibits the
characteristics of a simple supply and demand relationship: research-
ers demand ever-richer datasets to solve genomic puzzles while a
burgeoning industry of genomic sequencing hardware and service
providers compete to supply the tools and technologies needed to gen-
erate those datasets.
For genomic researchers, the identification of the genetic bases
for certain traits was underway prior to the Human Genome Project's
In addition, the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) hosts the
Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP), which serves as a central point of
research access for certain research that investigates genotype and phenotype interac-
tion. NCBI, dpGaP: Genotype and Phenotypes, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gap
(last visited May 3, 2010). Although previously dbGaP data was made available in
two tiers, with aggregate study data provided as "open-access" to the general public
and individual, de-identified study data available only as "controlled-access data" to
authorized users, the NCBI removed its "open access" data in September of 2008 due
to re-identification concerns, restricting all dbGaP study data to authorized research-
ers. See discussion infra Part II. See Nils Homer et al., Resolving Individuals Contri-
buting Trace Amounts of DNA to Highly Complex Mixtures Using High-Density SNP
Genotyping Microarrays, PLoS GENETICS, Aug. 2008, at 1, 4; Catherine Clabby,
DNA Research Commons Scaled Back, 97 AM. SCIENTIST 113, 113 (2009), available
at http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/num2/dna-research-commons-scaled-back/
1.
In response to these events other major institutions, including the Wellcome Trust,
and the Broad Institute, also removed pooled or aggregate human DNA data from
their websites. See Jennifer Couzin, Genetic Privacy. Whole-Genome Data Not
Anonymous, Challenging Assumptions, 321 SCIENCE 1278, 1278 (2008).
1 In addition to the Personal Genome Project, large-scale genomic research
projects are being conducted with support of research institutions, health care provid-
ers, commercial testing companies and federal, state, and local government organiza-
tions. For background information on the Personal Genome Project, see Pers.
Genome Project, Project Overview, http://www.personalgenomes.org/project.html
(last visited May 3, 2010). For examples of large-scale genomic research, see, e.g.,
Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., Nat'l Insts. of Health, ClinSeq: A Large-Scale
Medical Sequencing Clinical Research Pilot Study, http://www.genome.gov/
25521305 (last visited May 3, 2010); Coriell Personalized Med. Collaborative, About
the Study, http://cpmc.coriell.org/Sections/About/?SId-9 (last visited May 3, 2010);
Navigenics, Overview, http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/about us/ (last visited May
3, 2010); 23andMe, The 23andMe Research Revolution, https://www.23andme.com/
researchrevolution/overview/ (last visited May 3, 2010); The Genome Ctr. at Wash.
Univ., The Cancer Genome Atlas, http://genome.wustl.edu/highlights/article/the
cancer-genome atlas (last visited May 3, 2010); M.U.R.D.O.C.K. Study, The
MURDOCK Study: Measurement to Understand the Reclassification of Disease of
Cabarrus/Kannapolis, https://www.murdock-study.com/ (last visited May 3, 2010).
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completion, particularly for those traits, like Huntington's disease,
where family histories demonstrated a high degree of heritability and
strongly suggested a single gene-trait relationship. 20 These monogen-
ic traits - traits defined by a single gene - were the first to have their
genetic underpinnings clearly identified. It is now widely believed
that the majority of this "low-hanging fruit" has already been plucked.
Although public resources including the Human Genome Project,
the International HapMap Project, and the 1000 Genomes Project con-
tinue to produce increasingly refined maps of human genomic varia-
tion, there is a growing recognition that a host of factors beyond
common genetic variation, including rare genetic variants, copy num-
ber variation (CNV) and other rearrangements of the genome and
epigenetic or environmental factors, are key contributors to many
complex traits, demonstrating the need for richer datasets that include
whole-genome sequence data.2 ' The challenge now is to characterize
and understand the genomic underpinnings of more complex pheno-
types, such as height or heart disease. Although some progress has
been made in this area,2 2 the reality is that the genotype-phenotype
associations identified to date account for only a very small portion of
the exhibited population variance for nearly every complex trait.23
For example, although genomic research has identified more than
fifty regions of the genome that contribute to height, a recent study
found that those genetic loci were able to predict only four to six per-
20 In the case of Huntington's for instance, by using DNA marking methods
researchers had already determined the general location of the Huntington's gene by
1983; their work served as a departure point for the broader work conducted by the
Human Genome Project. See James F. Gusella et al., A Polymorphic DNA Marker
Genetically Linked to Huntington's Disease, 306 NATURE 234, 234-35 (1983); see
also John Hardy & Andrew Singleton, Genomewide Association Studies and Human
Disease, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1759, 1764 (2009) ("The vast majority of success in
defining genetic risk in disease has been a result of traditional gene-hunting efforts to
find mutations that underlie monogenic diseases.. . . In considering the genetics of
complex disease and particularly the role of common variants that affect expression, a
more nuanced perspective is useful.").
21 See David B. Goldstein, Common Genetic Variation and Human Traits,
360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1696, 1698 (2009); Mildred K. Cho, Translating Genomics
Into the Clinic: Moving to the Post-Mendelian World, 1 GENOME MED. 7.1 (2009);
Kelly A. Frazer et al., Human Genetic Variation and Its Contribution to Complex
Traits, 10 NATURE REv. GENETICS 241 (2009).
22 See, e.g., Joel N. Hirschhorn, Genomewide Association Studies - Illumi-
nating Biologic Pathways, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1699 (2009) (discussing recent
developments that lead to a potential path to gene discovery for polygenic diseases
and traits).
23 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 21, at 1696; Nicholas Katsanis, From
Association to Causality: The New Frontier for Complex Traits, I GENOME MED. 23,
23-23.2 (2009); Cho, supra note 21, at 7.2.
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cent of the variance in individual height, while a much less sophisti-
cated (and substantially less expensive) predictive model developed
by Sir Francis Galton in 1886, which relies solely on knowing the
heights of an individual's parents, was able to predict forty percent of
that same variance.24 Accordingly, to identify the genomic factors
that meaningfully contribute to complex phenotypes such as height,
researchers require datasets that allow them to peer deeply into indi-
vidual genomes in search of rare genetic modifications and other
sources of variation and test their hypotheses against large cohorts of
both similar and dissimilar populations. 2 5
Not to be overlooked is the increasing demand from non-research
users of genomic sequence data, including medical practitioners and
individuals seeking sequence data for clinical and recreational purpos-
es. Although these groups have not traditionally demanded sequence
data on a large scale, the number of genomic data providers continues
to increase. 2 6 Direct-to-consumer (DTC) sequencing companies are
already providing whole-genome sequencing 27 and facilitating large-
24 See Yurii S. Aulchenko et al., Predicting Human Height by Victorian and
Genomic Methods, 17 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 1070 (2009). Depending on your pers-
pective, the news is either better or worse for other traits. Eye color, for example, is a
complex trait insofar as it is influenced by a number of genes. Unlike height, howev-
er, eye color is not a continuum trait (i.e., there a finite number of phenotypes that
will be expressed). A recent paper published a method for predicting eye color from
genotype, with between seventy percent and ninety percent accuracy depending on
the color to be predicted. That prediction rate is certainly better than in the height
example, but it is limited to (a) "Dutch people of European ancestry" and (b) a pheno-
typically-simple trait (i.e., eye color is not only a discrete trait but it is also, unlike
cancer or diabetes, easy to diagnose/observe and is fully penetrant because everyone's
eyes have color). See Cheryl Jones, Genetic Test Predicts Eye Color, NATURE.COM,
Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090309/full/news.2009.145.html.
25 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 21, at 1697-98 (discussing how genome-
wide association studies may benefit from the study of rare variants); Hirschhorn,
supra note 22, at 1699 (explaining that genomewide association studies are effective
at "[d]iscovery of biologic pathways underlying polygenic diseases and traits").
26 As of July 2, 2009, GeneTests, a publicly funded medical genetic informa-
tion resource, reported a total of 1,171 clinics and 605 laboratories conducting tests
for a total of 1,790 diseases. See NCBI, Welcome to GeneTests, http://www.ncbi.nlm
.nih.gov/sites/GeneTests/?db=GeneTests (last visited May 3, 2010). In addition, an
expanding group of genomic service providers, including, most prominently,
23andMe, Navigenics, deCODEme, DNADirect, Pathway Genomics, Knome, and
Illumina, are offering their services - frequently single nucleotide polymorphism
(SNPs) genotyping, with the exception of Knome and Illumina, which provide whole-
genome sequencing - directly to consumers and/or to healthcare providers. These
DTC providers market their services for a variety of uses ranging from the explora-
tion of an individual's genealogical history to a personalized disease risk assessment
to a form of clinical diagnostic or preventative care.
27 At the end of 2008, the least expensive commercially available whole-
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scale genomic research,28 work that will both meet and create demand
for the next-generation sequencing that public genomics researchers
require.
On the supply side, an expanding number of companies2 9 are
competing to meet genomic researchers' demands for increasingly
rich datasets at grant-friendly prices. Persistent and rapid technologi-
genome sequence was provided by Knome, and came with a $350,000 price tag.
Since then, Knome lowered its price to $99,000, and held an eBay charity auction in
which the starting price for a whole-genome sequence was $68,000. Genomic se-
quencing platform provider Illumina also entered the consumer market in June, 2009,
offering a $48,000 whole-genome sequence. The service imposes several require-
ments, however, as it must be ordered in consultation with a physician and individuals
must turn to a third party - including any of several other DTC genomic service pro-
viders - for interpretive guidance. See Knome, Inc., X PRIZE Foundation and Knome
Spotlight DNA Day with Historic Charity Auction of Whole Genome Sequence
(2008), http://www.knome.com/about/news/20090423.html; Rachel Lehmann-Haupt,
$99,000 to See Your Future?, MSN MONEY, Apr. 10, 2009, http://articles
.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/HomeMortgageSavings/99000-to-see-your-future
.aspx#pageTopAchor; Kevin Davies, Illumina to Offer $48,000 Personal Genome
Sequencing Service, Bio-IT WORLD.COM, June 11, 2009, http://www.bio-itworld.con
news/06/11/09/illumina-personal-genome-sequencing-service.html. Other commer-
cial sequencers include CoFactor Genomics. See CoFactor Genomics, New to Next-
Gen?: Next Generation Sequencing in the Context of Today's Science,
http://cofactorgenomics.com/next-gen/ (last visited May 3, 2010) (listing the cost of
sequencing at $23,000). Not commercially available as of this writing but expected to
be $5,000 and on sale in 2009. Julia Karow, Complete Genomics to Offer $5,000
Human Genome as a Service Business in Q2 2009, GENOMEWEB, Nov. 4, 2008,
http://www.genomeweb.com/sequencing/complete-genomics-offer-5000-human-ge
nome-service-business-q2-2009.
28 Examples include the Scripps Genomic Health Initiative and 23andMe
Parkinson's Community: Strength in Numbers, which aims to recruit 10,000 people to
participate in a GWA study of Parkinson's disease by making 23andMe's genetic
testing product available to eligible participants at a discounted price. See supra note
19; 23andMe, 23andMe Parkinson's Community: Strength in Numbers, https://www
.23andme.com/pd/join/ (last visited May 3, 2010); see also Andrew Pollack, Google
Co-Founder Backs Vast Parkinson's Study, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at BI .
29 In the past several years, the traditional Sanger sequencing method has
been replaced by "next-generation" commercial DNA sequencing platforms offered
by Roche, Illumina, Applied Biosystems, and Helicos BioSciences. Even as these
new sequencing techniques provide tremendous sequencing output at previously
unimaginable resolution, speed and, most importantly, price, they are already being
challenged by newer entrants to the market, including sequencing-as-a-service pro-
viders Knome and Complete Genomics and so-called "third-generation sequencers"
Oxford Nanopore and Pacific Biosciences. The next wave of commercial sequencers
- companies like NABsys and BioNanomatrix - are making still more astounding
promises, like NABsys's goal of sequencing a genome "for less than $100 in under an
hour." Ryan McBride, NABsys Secures $4M First Round to Develop Electronic DNA
Sequencing, XcoNoMY, May 5, 2009, http://www.xconomy.com/boston/2009/05/05/
nabsys-secures-4m-first-round-to-develop-electronic-dna-sequencing/.
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cal advances in DNA sequencing have driven the price of genomic
sequencing down sharply over the past decade, with cost falling at a
pace that outstrips standard models for rapid technological innova-
tion.30 These advances promise to transform genomic sequencing into
a commodity, accessible and affordable for researchers, and even in-
dividuals. 31 As prices continue to fall, there seems little doubt that the
era of the $1,000 genome,32 and perhaps even the $100 33 genome, is
nearly upon us.
30 See GUYER & FELSENFELD, supra note 5 ("During this time, and especially
in the past few years, sequencing costs have decreased faster than Moore's Law and
sequencing capacity has increased at an ever-greater pace."); see also David Ewing
Duncan, Discount DNA, PORTFOLIO.COM, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.portfolio.com/
views/columns/natural-selection/2008/12/17/Discount-DNA ("Right now, gene-
testing companies will sell you a near-complete perusal of your own DNA for some-
where between $100,000 and $350,000. A year ago it cost $1 million. Five years ago,
the cost of the first complete human genome was S2.7 billion." Duncan's pricing, of
course, is already far out of date.).
31 DTC genomic service companies continue to reduce the price of their
services while expanding their offerings. DTC genotyping is available for as little as
$99 and whole-genome sequencing is available for $48,000. See supra note 28.
While some critics question the value of the genetic association information provided
by even the most reputable DTC companies. See, e.g., Grace Wong, Why Screening
Your Genes Is Big Business, CNNHEALTH.COM, May 6, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/
2009/HEALTH/05/05/consumer.genomics ("David Goldstein, head of the Center for
Human Genome Variation at Duke University, believes that given the current know-
ledge of how genes influence disease, there is only a 'recreational' use for retail
tests."). The field has nonetheless attracted several companies rushing eager to take
advantage of consumer enthusiasm for genetic testing, including Atlas Sports Genet-
ics, which offers a $149 test that "[a]ims to predict a child's natural athletic strengths"
on the basis of a single gene. Juliet Macur, Born to Run? Little Ones Get Test for
Sports Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at Al.
Whole-genome sequencing is offered to consumers by Knome for $99,000 and Illu-
mina for $48,000 and commercially by companies like CoFactor and Complete Ge-
nomics for around $20,000, with the promise of complete sequencing for a mere
$5,000 in 2009. See supra note 27; see also Duncan, supra note 30; Erika Check
Hayden, Genome Sequencing: The Third Generation, 457 NATURE 768 (2009); Da-
niel MacArthur, Complete Genomics Back in Action After 6 Month Funding Delay,
GENETIC FUTURE, http://scienceblogs.com/geneticfuture/2009/08/completegenomics
back-in acti_ .php (last visited May 3, 2010).
32 While the $1,000 genome presents a reasoned guess at the level where
individual genomic sequencing will be cost-effective, it is far from a rigid threshold
value above which truly personalized medicine will remain unattainable. See, e.g., G.
M. Church, The Personal Genome Project, MOLECULAR Sys. BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2005).
Instead, "[t]he '$1,000 genome' has become shorthand for the promise of DNA-
sequencing capability made so affordable that individuals might think the once-in-a-
lifetime expenditure to have a full personal genome sequence . . . is worthwhile."
G.M. Church, Genomes for ALL, Sci. AM. 47, 48 (2006); see also Nature Genetics,
Question of the Year, http://www.nature.com/ng/qoty/index.html (last visited May 3,
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Not surprisingly, this combination of prevalent but poorly unders-
tood complex traits and plummeting genomic sequencing costs has
produced a new generation of research studies. This work seeks to
untangle the connection between genotype and phenotype by collect-
ing and categorizing comprehensive genomic and trait data of large
numbers of individuals. In contrast to the reference data produced by
the Human Genome Project, HapMap Project, and 1000 Genomes
Project or genome-wide association studies that narrowly focus on
specific traits, this next generation of genomic research aims to devel-
op large and detailed databases of individual human genotypic and
phenotypic variation. These complex databases will match individua-
lized genomic data - likely whole-genome sequence data in the near
future - with equally detailed phenotypic and environmental data,
providing researchers more insight into the genomic and environmen-
tal bases of complex traits. These projects, of which the Personal Ge-
nome Project is the clearest example, represent in size, scope, and
structure a new model of human genomic research - what we shall
define and refer to throughout this Article as "public genomics."
The notion that genomic research should be "public" is hardly
novel. The Human Genome Project was publicly funded, and its re-
sults are publicly available.34 Subsequent milestone genomic research
2010) (compiling responses of prominent geneticists to the question, "What would
you do if it became possible to sequence the equivalent of a full human genome for
only $1,000?"); Julia Karow, PGP to Publish Initial Data Sets Next Month as Church
Predicts $1,000 Genome in 2009, IN SEQUENCE, Sept. 23, 2008, http://www
.genomeweb.com/sequencing/pgp-publish-initial-data-sets-next-month-church-pre
dicts- I 000-genome-2009.
3 See, e.g., ScienceDaily, The 15-Minute Genome: Faster, Cheaper Genome
Sequencing on the Way, July 29, 2009, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/
07/090727191912.htm (describing Pacific Biosciences and its attempt to produce a
$100 genome using single molecule real-time sequencing); McBride, supra note 29
(discussing NABsys's goal of a $100 genome in under an hour); Lauren Gravitz,
TRIO: $100 Genome, TECH. REV., Mar.-Apr. 2009, available at http://www
.technologyreview.com/biomedicine/22112/ (describing BioNanomatrix's belief that
it can reach the $100 genome target in five years).
34 The HGP information was published in a database known as GenBank and
has been annotated and packaged for public consumption by both public (e.g., Uni-
versity of California Santa Cruz) and public-private (e.g., Ensembl) entities. The
UCSC browser incorporates data from the Encyclopedia of DNA Elements
(ENCODE) Consortium, an international research collaborative funded by NJHGRI.
Ensembl is a joint collaboration of EMBL-EBI and the Wellcome Trust Sanger
Institute (with additional funding from NIHGRI, among other bodies) designed to
automatically annotate the human genome sequence. See UCSC Genome Bioinfor-
matics, About the UCSC Genome Bioinformatics Site, http://genome.ucsc.edu/ (last
visited May 3, 2010); e!Ensembl, About the Ensembl Project, http://uswest.ensembl
.org/info/about/intro.html (last visited May 3, 2010).
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efforts have featured similar public elements, and many other projects
receive public funding and deposit their data in widely accessible da-
tabases.. 35 . As used in this Article, however, "public" is given a more
expansive meaning, embodying what we believe to be the crucial cha-
racteristics of the next generation of human genomic research
projects.
Public genomics, as that term is used throughout, refers to
projects that satisfy each of the following criteria:
Publicly Available Data. Raw participant data is made available
to the public without charge and with minimal or no restrictions.3 6
Research datasets that are subject to access controls (e.g., where only
a limited number of authorized researchers are permitted to analyze
the data)37 fail to satisfy this criterion, as do privately operated com-
mercial datasets. 8  Publishing data directly into the public domain
permits unfettered access by Nobel Laureates and self-taught patients
alike, allowing an unrestricted universe of researchers to use the data
in seeking answers to an unlimited number of questions. Developing
open-access datasets democratizes genomics research39 and harnesses
35 See supra note 19 (discussing HuGENet and dbGaP). Other examples
include the National Institute of General Medical Sciences (NIGMS), which is pro-
viding grant money to create a Pharmacogenomics Knowledge Base (PharmGKB)
that will "present complete, comprehensive, and current knowledge in pharmacoge-
nomics, backed by critical datasets ... and the most compelling literature." See U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PHARMACOGENOMICs KNOWLEDGE BASE,
PHARMGKB (R24), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-GM-10-002.html
(last visited May 3, 2010).
36 The PGP, for example, publishes submitted participant data - both pheno-
typic and genotypic data - directly to a publicly accessible database. See Pers.
Genome Project, http://www.personalgenomes.org/ (last visited May 3, 2010).
3 The dbGaP data is a typical example of this. Similarly restricted genomic
databases include the Genetic Association Information Network (GAIN) and the
Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium (WTCCC). See Jane Kaye et al., Data
Sharing in Genomics - Re-Shaping Scientific Practice, 10 NATURE REVIEWS
GENETICS 331, 333 (2009).
38 A recent trend in the DTC genomics space has seen commercial service
providers, including 23andMe, utilize crowd-sourcing techniques to recruit research
participants. See 23andMe, The 23andMe Research Revolution, https://www
.23andme.com/researchrevolution/ (last visited May 3, 2010). However, public par-
ticipation in research, while important, is not sufficient to satisfy this criterion of
public genomics. In order to do so, the data generated by the research must be pro-
vided in an open-source fashion. See Dan Vorhaus, Crowd-Sourcing vs. Open-
Sourcing in Consumer Genomics, GENOMICS L. REP. (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www
.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/08/25/crowd-sourcing-vs-open-sourc
ing-in-consumer-genomics/ (discussing distinction between crowd-sourcing and
open-source).
3 To make public genomics datasets truly accessible they will need to be
coupled with appropriate interpretive tools, as with the genome browsers already
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the wisdom of crowds to and encourages innovation and collaboration
in building more useful datasets and conducting more collaborative
and productive research.40
Linked Participant Data. Genotype and phenotype data supplied
by participants are directly linked within the dataset. There are no
promises, explicit or implicit, of anonymization, confidentiality, or
any other form of de-identification. This explicit association of data
enriches the core dataset and enables researchers to more directly in-
volve participants in their research, including permitting the return of
research results directly to participants.4 1 This feature is also critically
offered by UCSC and Ensembl. See Kaye et al., supra note 37. With the expected
proliferation of genomic sequence data driven by next-generation sequencing tech-
nology, there is a clear need for next-generation interpretive tools. See Daniel
MacArthur, Next-Generation Genome Browsers, GENETIC FUTURE,
http://scienceblogs.com/geneticfuture/2009/03/next-generationgenomebrowser.php
(May 3, 2010) (discussing visual and organizational methods in which genomic in-
formation can be conveyed). One early example is the GENESTAT information
portal, which is a Wikipedia-style resource that focuses on epidemiological genetic
association studies and collates key papers, websites and software. See Samuli Ripatti
et al., GENESTA T: An Information Portal for Design and Analysis of Genetic Associ-
ation Studies, 17 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 533 (2009).
40 The concept of the wisdom of crowds originated in 1906 with the ubiquit-
ous Francis Galton. He observed, that 800 visitors to an agricultural fair had little
individual luck estimating the weight of a butchered ox, but that the average of their
individual estimates was almost exactly correct. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF
CROWDS xi-xiv (2004). For contemporary examples in science and research, see, e.g.,
Pascal Hingamp et al., Metagenome Annotation Using a Distributed Grid of Under-
graduate Students, 6 PLoS BIOLOGY 2362, available at http://www.plosbiology.org/
article/info:doi/10.1371/joumal.pbio.0060296 (last visited May 3, 2010); Richard Van
Noorden, Chemistry Paper Pwned by Live-Blog Experiments, NATURE.COM, July 27,
2009, http://blogs.nature.com/news/thegreatbeyond/2009/07/chemistry_paperpwned
byiveb.html. Other examples of the successful crowd-sourcing of scientific re-
search include Open Wetware, in which a broad community of researchers makes
their raw data freely accessible. OpenWetWare, Overview, http://www.openwetware
.org/wiki/OpenWetWare:About (last visited May 3, 2010); SNPedia, SNPedia:FAQ,
http://www.snpedia.com/index.php/SNPedia:FAQ (last visited May 3, 2010), a decen-
tralized and open-access resource that collates research and resources surrounding
SNPs; open-access resource that collates research and resources surrounding SNPs,
and the open-access journals published by the Public Library of Science in which
every article is freely accessible and searchable. See Pub. Library of Sci., Home,
http://www.plos.org/ (last visitedMay 3, 2010). In addition, the NTH recently re-
newed its policy that all published results of NIH-funded research be deposited into
the publicly searchable, full-text database PubMed Central no later than 12 months
after publication. To view NIH's Public Access Policy, see Nat'l Insts. of Health,
U.S. Dept. of Human Servs., Overview, http://publicaccess.nih.gov/ (last visited May
3, 2010).
41 The decision of whether or not to return research results directly to pa-
tients is a controversial one that demands a case-by-case analysis of the participant
population and the results in question. One recent survey interviewed potential study
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important to longitudinal studies, which are likely to become increa-
singly common in large-scale genomic research. 42  Although some
genomic research projects provide such data confidentially to partici-
pants4 3 or only to certain authorized researchers, satisfying both this
criterion and the criterion of publicly available data necessitates that
public genomics participants consent to share their genomic data
openly with the world. Although the linkage of phenotypic and geno-
typic research data does not necessarily entail that the individuals
supplying such data be individually identified," the content of the data
renders it inherently identifiable when placed in the public domain, as
described in more detail in Part II. Due to the impracticability of pre-
serving participant privacy in the context of such linked datasets, pub-
lic genomics depends on "information altruists" 45 who are willing to
forego traditional expectations of informational privacy and confiden-
participants across the country and concluded that, on the whole, "[flocus groups
participants voiced a strong desire to be able to access individual research results."
Juli Murphy et al., Public Expectations for Return of Results from Large-Cohort
Genetic Research, 11 Am. J. BIOETHICs 36, 41 (2008). Murphy, her coauthors, and
other commentators also discuss the risks of such disclosure, including such concerns
as blurring the line between research and the practice of medicine and subjecting
individuals to risks or uncertainty based on genomic research results. See also
Michelle N. Meyer, The Kindness of Strangers: The Donative Contract between Sub-
jects and Researchers and the Non-Obligation to Return Individual Results of Genetic
Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44, 44-45 (2008) (arguing that the results of Murphy
and his coauthors, indicating that participants express a preference for research re-
sults, does not create a binding obligation or duty on researchers to return such re-
sults). These concerns are taken up by this Article in detail in Parts II and IlI, infra.
42 See, e.g., Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr., Genetics and Public Policy Center
Receives Funding for Public Consultation Project, Aug. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.dnapolicy.org/news.release.php?action=detail&pressreleaseid=134 (de-
scribing a $1.6 million follow-on funding award by NHGRI in 2009 in support of
assessing public attitudes about a large-scale U.S. population-based study that "likely
would involve the participation of hundreds of thousands of U.S. volunteers, who
would be followed for a period of many years to ascertain and quantify the major
environmental and genetic contributors to common illnesses.").
43 See, for example, the CPMC and Scripps research projects, both of which
intend to provide certain data directly and confidentiality to participants as part of
their research protocols. See supra note 20.
4 Although the PGP does not publicly link participant names to individual
genotypic and phenotypic information - and while we are aware of no other study that
does so - the PGP did publicly identify its first ten participants. See Pers. Genome
Project, PGP-10, http://www.personalgenomes.org/pgpl0.html (last visited May 3,
2010); Daniel MacArthur, Look into the Eyes of the PGP-10, http://scienceb logs
.com/geneticfuture/2008/12/look into the eyesof thepgpl.php (last visited May 3,
2010) (discussing the online identification of the Personal Genome Project partici-
pants).
45 See Isaac S. Kohane & Russ B. Altman, Health Information Altruists - A
Potentially Critical Resource, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2074, 2074-77 (2005).
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tiality in order to further scientific research and, frequently, who are
also willing to participate directly in that research.46 While the open
publication of individually identifiable genomic data carries known
and unknown risks, it can also produce unanticipated benefits.4 7
Portability of Data. Public genomic datasets are enriched by
combining the detailed information profiles of large numbers of iden-
tifiable individuals, providing researchers with the ability to compare
individual genotype-phenotype data against a wide variety of suffi-
ciently-sized populations. Although projects with large cohorts are
becoming more common - for instance, the PGP and the Coriell
Personalized Medicine Collaborative intend to enroll 100,000 individ-
uals, while the UK BioBank aspires to 500,00048 - the principles of
public genomics promote data-sharing and interoperability. Public
genomics data, therefore, is not tied to any particular project and may
move freely to other genomics projects, with each such project -
whether conducted by a government, a university, a business, or an
individual and whether consisting of one or one million participants -
able to harvest and, in some cases, seed the public genomics com-
mons 49 The PGP database, for example, is governed by a Creative
46 Examples of public genomics pioneers include Craig Venter, James
Watson and George Church; each was among the very first to release identifiable
genomic information into the public domain.
47 George Church, the first participant in the PGP, experienced one such
benefit of public genomics. Church increased the dose of his cholesterol medicine
after a complete stranger - who happened to be a hematologist - reviewed the medi-
cal records Church had previously made available online. Matthew Herper, Going to
Church, FORBES.COM, Apr. 4, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0427/
020-biofuels-biotech-genetics-ideas-opinions.html. In addition, one of the members
of the "PGP-10" learned of a potential genetic predisposition to hypertrophic cardi-
omyopathy which prompted a follow-up visit to his physician. See Luke Timmerman,
Google, Microsoft May Help Usher in Personalized Medicine Wave,
Says George Church, XCONOMY, May 12, 2009, http://www.xconomy
.com/boston/2009/05/12/google-microsoft-may-help-usher-in-personalized-medi
cine-wave-says-george-church/.
48 In addition, the Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act, which was first
introduced in 2006 by Senator Barack Obama and introduced in Congress again in
2007 and 2008, would, if passed, instruct the Secretary of HHS to "advance the field
of genomics and personalized medicine" through establishment of "a national bio-
banking distributed database . . . a system for the integration of data, including ge-
nomic data and associated environmental and clinical health information, which shall
facilitate the pooled analysis and synthesis of such data." S. 3822, 109th Cong. § 5
(2006). Although not specifically discussed in the proposed legislation, such a na-
tional biobank would be likely to rival the UK BioBank in size and scope.
49 The notion of a "genome commons" traces back at least to Steven Brenner
in 2007, when he proposed the idea of a public resource to store, verify and annotate
information on human genetic variation. Steven E. Brenner, Commentary, Common
Sense For Our Genomes, 449 NATURE 783, 783-84 (2007); Jing Tang et al., Integral-
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Commons CCO "no rights reserved" tool"o which permits transfer to
and from, and commingling with, other public genomics datasets
without restriction.
Voluntary and Informed Participation. This last characteristic is
admittedly a normative judgment rather than a descriptive attribute.
Voluntary, informed participation is not unique to public genomics,
but the field's other features add an additional dimension to informed
consent. Given the sometimes sensitive nature of genomic data and
the still-novel structure of public genomics research, we argue that it
would be irresponsible to publish an individual's genomic and pheno-
typic data in a publicly available, portable, and linked format, to be
used by all comers for any purpose whatsoever, in the absence of any-
thing less than truly voluntary and informed participant consent. For
this reason robust informed consent protocols5' and other human sub-
jects research protections52 are integral features of public genomics.
"Public genomics" is characterized by openness. information al-
truists publishing identifiable genotypic and phenotypic information
to an open-access database that facilitates the collaboration and dialo-
gue that genomic researchers desire and that will be necessary to un-
derstand the genomic underpinnings of our most complex traits and
ing Post-Genomic Approaches as a Strategy to Advance Our Understanding of
Health and Disease, GENOME MED., Mar. 4, 2009, at 35.1, 35.4 (discussing the need
to combine multiple datasets, including multiple types of datasets, and concluding
that "[w]hile there are clearly obstacles that need to be overcome, biological models
based upon multiple datasets are likely to become the basis that drives future re-
search"); Kaye et al., supra note 37 (discussing the changing landscape of genomic
data sharing and the challenges for both participants and researchers in facilitating
such sharing).
50 See Creative Commons, About CCO - "No Rights Reserved," http://
creativecommons.org/about/ccO (last visited May 3, 2010) (describing the CCO tool,
which operates as a waiver of copyright and associated rights and, in the event the
waiver is ineffective, is backed by a more traditional unconditional, irrevocable, non
exclusive, royalty free license for any use). For more on the implementation of the
CCO license in the context of the Personal Genome Project, see Creative Commons,
Expanding the Public Domain: Part Zero, http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/
13304 (last visited May 3, 2010).
51 One immediate consequence of this commitment to truly informed consent
is that it restricts another desirable but not immediately attainable feature of public
genomics: representative public enrollment and participation. Although some public
genomics projects are generally open to the public (given certain minimum eligibility
criteria), the rigorous informed consent criterion effectively limits the potential partic-
ipant population, at least at this point in time. One of the ultimate goals of conducting
responsible public genomics is to improve public understanding and acceptance of
genomic research such that, in time, public genomics participant populations will
become increasingly representative of the population as a whole.
52 See infra Part IV.A.
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intractable diseases. But such a high degree of openness comes with
risks and challenges that cannot be ignored or minimized. Part II ex-
amines the ethical and social dimensions of public genomics and illu-
strates why voluntary participation and an aggressive commitment to
openness and truly informed consent are of fundamental importance
to responsible public genomics.
II. ETHICAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES IN
PUBLIC GENOMICS
Public genomic research has engendered contentious debate in
almost every conceivable forum: the scientific and legal literatures,
the research and regulatory communities, Congress and state legisla-
tures, and the popular media. 3 The specific points of ethical and pol-
icy disputes are many, but this Article highlights several areas where
public genomics raises difficult policy questions that challenge tradi-
tional principles of research ethics.
First, can research capable of generating the rich datasets that de-
fine public genomics, and that are necessary to unravel the genomic
bases of complex traits, satisfy traditional privacy expectations of
research subjects, or is the promise of such protection illusory?
Second, what can and should be done to ensure that informed
consent is truly "informed" in light of these privacy concerns and the
shifting landscape of genomic science which, among other complexi-
ties, demands that genomic datasets be amenable both to future uses
and to research questions that cannot be specifically identified or con-
sented to at the outset?
Third, given that certain genomic information inherently pos-
sesses both research and clinical value, what duties does a genomic
researcher have to identify and inform a participant of the clinical
significance of genomic information? If researchers have either an
ethical or a legal duty of disclosure, is it a continuing duty or only an
initial duty? To what extent should researchers be subject to legal
regulations that are intended to regulate the practice of medicine that
may simultaneously restrict researchers' ability to disclose certain
findings or to discuss the implications of those findings with research
participants?
Each of the foregoing questions implicates a tension between the
societal benefits of public genomics research and the interests of indi-
5 See Lori Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 22, 23-24; Mark A. Rothstein, Expanding the Ethical Analysis ofBiobanks, 33
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89 (2005) (recognizing that biobanks complicate traditional is-
sues of informed consent and privacy).
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vidual participants in that research. As discussed in Part III, the cur-
rent legal and regulatory regime does not adequately address these
tensions. Some of this inadequacy is due to such generic factors as
divided authority, regulatory inertia, jurisdictional confusion, and the
reality that scientific and technological innovation inevitably outpaces
the corresponding and necessary legal and regulatory response. But
there are also factors inherent in public genomics that challenge three
of the traditional pillars of human subjects research: privacy, informed
consent, and the distinction between scientific research and the prac-
tice of medicine.
A. Problems of Privacy
The traditional expectation that genomic data supplied by research
participants should be subject to robust privacy protections arises out
of a complex mixture of basic ethical principles and a general concern
that the release of identifiable genomic data into the wrong hands
would pose significant risk for individual participants. At the ethical
core of this concern lies the principle of beneficence. Beneficence is
one of the three pillars of the Belmont Report, the foundational source
of modern human subjects research protections in this country, which
requires researchers to minimize possible harms.54 Leaving aside the
question of whether an individual's genomic data warrants or is ame-
nable to robust privacy protections, it is indisputable that the current
norm in genomic research requires investigators and funders to devote
significant resources to the protection of participants' genomic data.
Large and influential genomic research projects, including the
HapMap Project and the UK BioBank, have strongly emphasized their
commitment to privacy. 5 More recently, influential genomic research
undertakings such as the 1000 Genomes Project and the Coriell Per-
sonalized Medicine Collaborative (CPMC) have taken a similar ap-
54 "In this document, beneficence is understood in a stronger sense, as an
obligation. Two general rules have been formulated as complementary expressions of
beneficent actions in this sense: (1) do not harm and (2) maximize possible benefits
and minimize possible harms." NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT], available at
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html#gob.
ss Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., From Genetic Privacy to Open Consent, 9
NATURE REV. GENETICS 406, 408 (2008) ("The HapMap informed-consent protocol
does not unambiguously guarantee anonymity or confidentiality of participants' ge-
netic information. On the contrary, it even mentions the risk of tracing identity
through publicly available HapMap data. Nevertheless, the consent protocol clearly
suggests that the risk of re-identification is vanishingly small.").
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proach, emphasizing their strong commitment to privacy in both their
public pronouncements and their informed consent materials.5 6 The
CPMC, for instance, makes "every effort to ensure [participant] priva-
cy," including the use of "the most sophisticated computer security
tools currently available to store and protect [participants'] informa-
tion," sample barcoding and secure storage procedures, as well as the
provision of a Certificate of Confidentiality (discussed below). 57 The
resulting norm in genomic research, as well as the likely expectation
of most participants in such projects, is a structure in which genomic
data is guarded by the most sophisticated and robust data protection
and privacy protocols available.
Unfortunately, growing evidence suggests that both explicit and
implicit promises to maintain participant privacy may be misleading,
if not entirely illusory. Under the broad heading of "privacy," which
is concerned with limiting access to certain information - in this case
the genomic data of research participants - fall the related concepts
of "confidentiality" and "anonymity." "Confidentiality" typically
involves using coded identifiers, such as barcodes, to link subjects to
their samples and information. "Anonymity," by contrast, usually
refers to the stripping of all or most of the potential identifiers from
samples and information.5
In recent years, commentators and researchers alike have raised
challenges to the privacy norm - whether manifest as promises of
anonymity or of confidentiality - and have attempted to show that
privacy guarantees are likely not as ironclad as they appear to poten-
tial participants at the time of consent.59 Perhaps the strongest warn-
56 See 1000 GENOMES PROJECT, 1000 GENOMES PROJECT: DEVELOPING A
RESEARCH RESOURCE FOR STUDIES OF HUMAN GENETIC VARIATION - CONSENT
TO PARTICIPATE, http://www.1000genomes.org/bcms/1000_genomes/Documents/
Informed%20Consent%2OForm%20Template.pdf (last visited May 3, 2010) [herei-
nafter CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE]; Coriell Personalized Med. Collaborative, Consent
to Participate in a Research Study, http://cpmc.coriell.org/Docs/PDF/Informed
Consent.pdf (last visited May, 3, 2010); Coriell Personalized Med. Collaborative,
Data and Sample Security, http://cpmc.coriell.org/Sections/About/Security.aspx?Pgld
=16 (last visited May 3, 2010); Coriell Personalized Med. Collaborative, Privacy
and Confidentiality, http://cpmc.coriell.org/Sections/About/Confidentiality.aspx?Pgld
141 (last visited May 3, 2010).
5 Coriell Personalized Med. Collaborative, Privacy and Confidentiality,
supra note 56.
5 Greely, supra note 17, at 349, 351.
5 See, e.g., Lunshof et al., supra note 55; Kaye et al., supra note 37; Nils
Homer et al., Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA to Highly
Complex Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Microarrays, 4 PLoS
GENETICS 1 (2008), available at http://www.plosgenetics.org/article/info:doi/l0
.1371/joumal.pgen.1000167; Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, How (Not) to
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ings come from the lawyer and ethicist Henry Greely, who goes so far
as to accuse some genomics projects of "twisting the meanings of
words like 'confidential,' 'anonymous,' 'human subjects,' 'informed
consent,' and 'justice' in ways that jeopardize, for the sake of admin-
istrative convenience and short-term research gains, the interests, the
,,60
wishes, and the rights of those who contributed to these resources.
Similarly, Lunshof et al. suggest that these illusory promises of priva-
cy violate the key ethical principle of veracity, undermining the va-
lidity of informed consent and thereby failing to adequately protect
human subjects research participants. 6 1' 62
Focusing specifically on confidentiality, Greely argues that "[t]he
problem with coded identifiers is that they cannot be made definitely
secure."63 He suggests a number of plausible security breach scena-
rios, including misconduct by the person who retains the key to the
code (often called the "trusted intermediary"),6 theft of the key by
hackers,65 and the loss of laptops or other storage devices that contain
the keys or the sensitive information itself. 66 These kinds of possibili-
ties have been rendered even more plausible by recent breaches,
which include the compromise of military personnel records by the
loss of a laptop,67 Kaiser Permanente's serious breach of confidentiali-
Protect Genomic Data Privacy in a Distributed Network: Using Trail Re-
identification to Evaluate and Design Anonymity Protection Systems, 37 J.
BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 179 (2004). See also supra note 19 (discussing dbGaP
data pullback).
6 Greely, supra note 17, at 344.
61 Lunshof et al., supra note 55, at 408.
62 In addition to the technical, ethical and legal concerns discussed above,
there is another more pragmatic concern associated with the potential failure to deliv-
er on privacy promises: the potential for a loss of public trust. Public genomics is
capable of flourishing only with the trust and participation of both the information
altruists that supply the projects with data and of society at large, which sanctions and
largely funds such public genomics research. While there are numerous ways to
violate the trust of individuals and of the public, an unexpected and high-profile ge-
nomic privacy breach could pose a serious threat to the future of public genomics.
See, e.g., Kaye et al., supra note 37, at 335 ("Establishing and maintaining global
public goodwill and trust is an ongoing task to ensure the future of sound, and hence
ethical, scientific research."); David Gurwitz et al., Children and Population Bio-
banks, 325 SCIENCE 818, 819 (2009) (discussing the importance of informed consent
in population biobanks involving children and concluding that "[t]he long-term bene-
fits of maintaining public trust in biomedical research ... justif extra governance
efforts and added costs").
63 Greely, supra note 17, at 350.
6 See Rothstein, supra note 53, at 95.
65 See Greely, supra note 17, at 351.
6 See id.
67 See Elect. Privacy Info. Ctr., Veterans Affairs Data Theft, available at
http://epic.org/privacy/vatheft/ (last visited May 3, 2010).
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ty as a result of a complex information technology accident,6 8 the use
of file-sharing applications by researchers to hack into medical
records, the theft of encrypted data from hard disks, the prediction
of social security numbers using statistical techniques, 7 1 and the inap-
propriate access and sale of patient medical data by employees of
healthcare insurers and providers, who were eventually convicted for
these crimes.72
Anonymization, according to Greely, takes all of the problems as-
sociated with confidential data and introduces a few new problems.
He provides a detailed explanation of how it would be possible to
identify a hypothetical subject - him - in an ostensibly "anonymized"
(information stripped of all identifiers) DNA biobank. Others have
tested the proposition by attempting to breach the privacy protections
of real-world and purportedly anonymized biobanks. For example,
researchers at Carnegie Mellon used two pieces of publicly available
information - date of birth and zip code of residence - to identify the
health records of the governor of Massachusetts. 7 3 In another exam-
ple, Homer et al. used "high-density single nucleotide polymorphism
(SNP) genotyping microarrays" - a widely available technology - to
determine whether a particular "individual's genomic DNA is present
at trace amounts within a complex mixture containing DNA from nu-
merous individuals." They claim to have done so "accurately and
robustly." 74 Although Homer et al. cite the example of identifying an
individual's DNA in a single degraded forensic sample, the technique
should also apply to pooled collections of samples, even when "shar-
ing only summary statistics." 75
In specific response to Homer et al.'s research, the National
Human Genome Research Institute (NHRGI) has restricted public
access to previously unrestricted portions of pooled, de-identified data
in its Genotype and Phenotype (dbGaP) dataset.76 The open-access
68 See Lunshof et al., supra note 55.
6 See, e.g., Bob Brewin, File-sharing Networks Used to Uncover Thousands
of Medical Records, NEXTGOV.com, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.nextgov.com/
nextgov/ng 20090227 9147.php.
70 John Markoff, A Method for Stealing Critical Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2008, at Cl.
71 John Markoff, A Weakness in Social Security Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 2009, at A14.
72 Charles Ornstein, Breaches in Privacy Cost Kaiser, L.A. TIMES, May 15,
2009, at A3.
n Malin & Sweeney, supra note 59, at 181-86.
74 Homer et al., supra note 59, at 1.
7 Id. at 9.
76 See Jennifer Couzin, Genetic Privacy: Whole-Genome Data Not Anonym-
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portion of dbGaP data included information on genetic variation ob-
served in people with such serious diseases as asthma, prostate cancer,
cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, Parkinson's disease, and amyo-
trophic lateral sclerosis. The new protocol will require NIH approval
before access is granted, a change that closes off a section of the
genomic commons to all but a handful of researchers and a develop-
ment that some fear "could delay or maybe even prevent some studies
"77
The cautionary lesson is that critics of the privacy promise are
correct: at least as a purely technical matter, anonymity and confiden-
tiality simply cannot be guaranteed in the context of most (if not all)
large-scale genomic research projects. Moreover, such guarantees
further test the ethical principle of veracity when they rest on Certifi-
cates of Confidentiality and purport, in the case of the CPMC, to
render participant records "strictly private."78 Certificates of Confi-
dentiality are issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services and intended "to protect the privacy of research subjects by
protecting investigators and institutions from being compelled to
release information that could be used to identify subjects within a
research project." 79 Although such certificates are an important indi-
cator of a research project's commitment to the privacy norm, these
certificates hardly provide an absolute guarantee of data privacy. As a
2006 North Carolina case involving Duke University researchers re-
veals,o Certificates of Confidentiality are of uncertain legal effect in
the face of a criminal defendant's rights to discover exculpatory evi-
dence and to confront and cross-examine witnesses.8 ' Accordingly, as
with other privacy protection measures, they are insufficient to un-
derwrite absolute privacy promises.
ous, Challenging Assumptions, 321 SCIENCE 1278, 1278 (2008) (describing the
dbGaP data restrictions, as well as similar restrictions implemented by the Wellcome
Trust and the Broad Institute, among other genomic research institutions).
77 Catherine Clabby, DNA Research Commons Scaled Back, 97 AM.
SCIENTIST 113, 113 (2009).
78 Coriell Personalized Med. Collaborative, supra note 56.
79 OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CERTIFICATES OF CONFIDENTIALITY: BACKGROUND INFORMATION, http:/grants.nih.gov/
grants/policy/coc/background.htm (last visited May 3, 2010).
so State v. Bradley, 634 S.E.2d 258 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
81 See Laura M. Beskow et al., Certificates of Confidentiality and Compelled
Disclosure of Data, 322 SCIENCE 1054, 1054 (2008); Clabby, supra note 77, at 114
("[L]aw enforcement is expanding the way it uses DNA to track suspects, even inno-
cent relatives of suspects in crime cases. In one case, investigators secretly obtained
from a medical clinic a DNA sample that belonged to the daughter of a suspected
serial killer to hasten their detective work.").
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Some projects are heeding these warnings and designing their re-
search and informed consent protocols accordingly. At one end of the
spectrum, the PGP provides no privacy promises whatsoever, stating
simply that participants' "genetic and trait information will not be
maintained or made available in a confidential or anonymous fa-
shion."82 Taking an intermediate approach, the 1000 Genomes Project
balances the traditional norm of robust privacy protection measures,
including over-enrollment and over-sampling, to ensure that "nobody
- not even you or us - will know for sure whether your sample was
used" in the project," with an open acknowledgement of the limita-
tions of such protections.83  The project's Informed Consent Form
Template addresses both known risks of re-identification ("although
only experts will know how to interpret [your genomic information],
there is a small chance that somebody could figure out how to connect
you with [that] information") and unknown risks ("as technology ad-
vances, there may be new ways of linking information back to you
that we cannot foresee now").84 Finally, at the far end of the privacy
spectrum lie research projects such as the CPMC. By assuring partic-
ipants that "no personal identifying information about you will be
released to anyone outside of the CPMC study without your authoriza-
tion,"" such projects downplay or even ignore what are categorized as
the the "remote" risks of re-identification of participant data and other
privacy breaches.
82 PGP CONSENT FORM, infra note 90, at § X(1.1). The PGP informed con-
sent form further elaborates: "Your genetic and trait information will be made availa-
ble via a publicly accessible website and database, according to the procedures
described above. Public disclosure of your information due to unintended data
breaches, including hacking or other activities outside of the procedures described
above, is also possible." Id. It is important to note that, as in the case of the PGP, a
lack of privacy promises does not mean that privacy is lacking entirely. Although
identifiable - particularly in the case of the first ten participants, the so-called '"PGP-
10"- the PGP does not explicitly identify its participants. This distinction - between
identifiable and identified - is a meaningful one: public genomics projects may well
take steps to prevent participants from becoming identified, including through the
application of robust privacy measures, while still acknowledging that participation
nevertheless carries a risk of identification based on the identifiable nature of the
contributed data.
83 CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE, supra note 56, at 4-5.
8 Id.
85 Coriell Personalized Med. Collaborative, supra note 56.
86 Id. The Coriell Personalized Medicine Collaborative revised Informed
Consent form continues on to say that "however, since there is a remote chance of
identification, all qualified investigators who have access to your data will sign legal
documents requiring them to protect the privacy of your information." Id Similarly,
subsection 3, entitled "Confidentiality Protections Through the Federal Government,"
states that "if you choose to release your genetic variant information to others . . .
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The practical difficulties of effecting perfect privacy - whether
complete confidentiality or anonymity - in the genomics research
context need not result in public genomics researchers' abandonment
of all privacy protection measures, nor should it forbid them from
accurately describing such measures to potential participants. Rather,
these challenges strongly suggest that genomic researchers must dili-
gently examine the tradition of implicit and explicit promises of pri-
vacy to participants - a suggestion that public genomics projects like
the 1000 Genomes Project and the PGP are heeding and one that car-
ries broad implications for traditional assumptions of both privacy and
informed consent more generally. While beneficence may require that
privacy be protected to the extent possible in the public genomics
context, veracity demands that it not be guaranteed unqualifiedly.
B. The Difficulty of "Informed" Consent
Informed consent is indisputably one of the foundational ethical
principles of human subjects research. From the trials of Nazi war
criminals87 to the Belmont Report to current federal regulations,8
the ethical balance between advancing important scientific research
and protecting human subjects has been struck only with the willing
and frilly informed consent of participants. While the risk of physical
harm to participants in public genomics research seems likely to be
low - preparing a genomic sequence in most cases requires little more
than a saliva sample or cheek swab from the participant - the intangi-
ble risks present a more difficult challenge. Accepting the model of
public genomics as set forth in Part I - including publicly available
and individually identifiable genotypic and phenotypic data - requires
that researchers and participants alike carefilly think through the as-
sociated risks. Because the researchers themselves cannot precisely
predict where genomics research will lead or what challenges it will
face, however, both parties must understand that researchers are in-
Coriell cannot guarantee the confidentiality of this information." Id. at § H(3). All
told, the risk of breach or re-identification is minimized - especially in comparison to
the efforts at disclosure undertaken by the 1000 Genome Project or the PGP - and the
implication is that a breach, should it occur, would be most likely due to a partici-
pant's own carelessness with her information.
87 Informed Consent is the first article of The Nuremberg Code. See 2
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 181-82 (1949).
88 Informed Consent is the first application of the three ethical principles
(respect for persons, beneficence, and justice) set forth in the Belmont Report. See
BELMONT REPORT, supra note 54.
89 Informed Consent is one of the core criteria for IRB approval of human
subjects research under the Common Rule. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (a)(4) (2008).
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capable of fully "informing" participants of all such risks. For exam-
ple, although the informed consent form for the Personal Genome
Project provides a lengthy but "non-comprehensive list of hypotheti-
cal scenarios that could pose risks," it advises participants to check
back frequently "to obtain the most current information regarding
potential risks and discomforts as they become apparent."90 Even
determining what information should be given to prospective sample
donors in order to make sure that their "consent" is "informed" at a
meaningful level is no easy task. The NHGRI spokesperson who an-
nounced that agency's decision to make the dbGaP dataset private
framed the problem succinctly: "How much do you tell people with-
out scaring them? How do you communicate the level of risk? What
level of risks are people willing to tolerate? How frequently do they
want to be asked?"9'
Here, again, the various public genomics projects now in devel-
opment illustrate a range of approaches to this problem. Returning to
the Coriell project, its informed consent form generally restricts its
discussion of participants' risks to those contained in the specific ge-
netic data returned to participants, including the risks of being pro-
vided with (i) inaccurate data, (ii) inaccurate or incomplete disease
risk assessment, (iii) data related to non-medically actionable diseases,
or (iv) misinterpretation of or apprehension about that data on the part92Asrei
of the participant. As previously discussed, the risk of a breach of
participant privacy is largely discounted in Coriell's informed consent
93process.
The PGP's informed consent agreement takes the opposite ap-
proach and includes a lengthy but "non-comprehensive list of hypo-
thetical scenarios that could pose risks" for participants and their
families.94 Although the disclosed risks range from discrimination -
by employers or insurers, regardless of whether it is lawful to do so,
or even friends or family members - to the planting of synthetic DNA
90 HARVARD MED. SCH., PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT CONSENT FORM § VII
(2009), http://www.personalgenomes.org/consent/PGP_Consent Approved03242009
.pdf [hereinafter PGP CONSENT FORM]. By the time of publication, the PGP Consent
Form will have been updated again to reflect changes in the project design and partic-
ipation, as well as clarifications of the risks involved in participation. While these are
important improvements to the PGP Consent Form, these changes do not materially
alter the PGP or the PGP Consent Form for purposes of this Article.
91 Clabby, supra note 77, at 114.92 See Coriell Personalized Med. Collaborative, supra note 56, at §§ E (2),
(3), (5), (6), (7).
9 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
9 PGP CONSENT FORM, supra note 90, at § VII.
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at a crime scene,95 participants are repeatedly warned that "the com-
plete set and magnitude of the risks that the public availability of
[your genomic data] poses to you and your relatives is not known at
this time."96 Participants are also advised to "check the [PGP's]
website regularly to obtain the most current information regarding
potential risks and discomforts as they become apparent." 97 The 1000
Genomes Project is similarly sensitive to the possibility of unknown
or uncertain future risks, warning participants that "we cannot always
foresee the results of research, so new risks may come up in the future
that we cannot predict now.""
"Informed," in the public genomics context, means both that
researchers use their best efforts to diligently identify risks to
participants - even remote risks or risks that the researchers judge to
be of insignificant value99 - and that participants are capable both of
understanding the nature and the magnitude of the risks presented.
More importantly, participants must also understand and internalize
the fact that participation entails as yet unknown (and potentially se-
rious) risks. From an ethical perspective, truly informed consent helps
to satisfy the dual goals of autonomy and beneficence. From a more
pragmatic perspective, informed consent will prepare participants
prior to enrollment so that any of the known or unknown risks that
later materialize will not cause participants to retrospectively view
their consent as uninformed.
Given the current state of genomic knowledge and the tremendous
anticipated size of many public genomics research projects, it is
statistically probable that risks - both predicted and unanticipated -
9 Id. Although discussed as a hypothetic risk in the PGP's informed consent
agreement, a recent paper in the journal Forensic Science International: Genetics
demonstrated that it is indeed possible to fabricate synthetic DNA to match the profile
of an individual without obtaining any actual tissue from that person, prompting the
lead author of the paper to comment, "You can just engineer a crime scene." Andrew
Pollack, DNA Evidence Can Be Fabricated, Scientists Show, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2009, at D3.
96 PGP CONSENT FORM, supra note 90, at § VII.
9 Id. The lengthy and aggressive disclosure of risks, including even those
that would appear to be remote, has not seemed to hamper, at least initially, the
PGP's ability to attract interested participants. As of early 2009 the PGP was over-
subscribed, with well over 13,000 indications of interest for 100 available openings in
the second phase of participant enrollment, despite minimal recruitment, enrollment
or publicity efforts up to that point.
98 Id.
9 It may be that a de minimis threshold for risk disclosure could and should
be developed, but such a threshold would need to be established over time and with
participation from researchers, participants, IRBs, and community members and other
stakeholders.
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will materialize over the life of a project and that some participants
will feel regret at having participated. There is likely no way to com-
pletely eliminate bad outcomes and participant regret other than
ceasing to perform socially valuable genomic research. Informed
consent allows participants - including the information altruists of
public genomics - to accept certain risks. The dichotomy for these
participants is not between a choice made with either full knowledge
or with complete ignorance of the risks of public genomics. All
choices will be made in ignorance of risks that are unknown but
presumed significant. In such circumstances, an informed consent
that fully discloses all known risks while duly acknowledging and
accepting an ignorance of unknown risks ensures that participants are
as informed as possible and less likely to experience episodes of post-
enrollment regret.
C. The Clinical Significance of Genomic Data
An individual's genomic sequence data inescapably holds clinical
significance. As understanding of the relationship between genotype
and phenotype expands, so too will the clinical significance of this
data. 00 From the researcher's perspective - as well as from a legal
perspective, as described in Part III - providing clinically significant
information or interpretation blurs the line between genomic research
and the practice of medicine. From the participant's standpoint, re-
ceiving a gigabyte-long0o' string of Gs, Ts, As, and Cs without any
discussion of the relationship between that string of letters and the
individual's predicted future trait or disease status would surely
amount to a disappointment, regardless of the content of the informed
consent.102 Public genomics participants may also expect some clini-
cal benefit (or at least some degree of understanding) as a result of the
100 Although it may not increase linearly or proportionally with scientific
understanding. It is possible, if not likely, that a deepening understanding of geno-
type-phenotype relationships will disclose relationships of such complexity or with
such attenuated genomic or genetic bases that the clinical significance of genomic
data in such cases will be minimal in comparison to the value of other environmental,
medical history or statistical data. Nevertheless, it is likely that the clinical utility of
an individual's genomic information - in purely absolute terms - is likely to increase
over time as it becomes more fully understood and additional genomic-drive diagnos-
tics and treatments are developed.
101 See Daniel MacArthur, How Much Data Is a Human Genome? It Depends
How You Store It., GENETIC FUTURE, June 28, 2008, http://www.genetic-future.com/
2008/06/how-much-data-is-human-genome-it.html (discussing different ways of
storing human genome data).
102 See, e.g., Murphy et al., supra note 41, at 40-41 (discussing research par-
ticipants' desire for return and explanation of research data).
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receipt of their genomic data, including an expectation of access to
higher levels of counseling or other clinically-relevant forms of fol-
low-up services, regardless of the researchers' ability to provide such
services, especially in large-scale public genomics projects. Although
the simpler solution might be to avoid returning any data of potential
clinical significance, strong arguments exist for the proposition that
researchers have a duty to inform participants of incidental findings if
their failure to do so could result in serious and avoidable harm.10 3
This creates a particular difficulty for genomic researchers, insofar as
findings of clinical significance are likely to be far more common in
this area than in other areas of scientific research. This is especially
true in the case of studies that generate complete exomic0 or genom-
ic data, where findings with clinical significance cannot properly be
termed "incidental" at all; these findings are simply an expected part
of the data generated for each participant.
The difficulty of how to respond to such significant findings is
compounded by the fact that researchers and clinicians may differ in
their understandings of whether data is "significant" or actionable.
Just as researchers may be unqualified to understand the clinical signi-
ficance of or proper clinical response to a participant's genomic data,
so too are clinicians likely to find themselves behind the curve in their
knowledge and implementation of the latest significant genomic re-
search. Even researchers who focus most diligently on understanding
the clinical implications of their data will be unfamiliar with the latest
103 See Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of incidental Findings in Human Sub-
jects Research: Establishing Researchers' Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 361, 362
(2008).
We argue that researchers owe research participants duties that are both eth-
ical and legal obligations: to disclose in the informed consent process the
possibility of discovering IFs and the plan for management; to recognize an
IF that arises during the course of research; to verify the presence of an IF
and evaluate its probable importance, obtaining expert consultation if ne-
cessary; and to offer to disclose an IF of likely clinical or reproductive im-
portance to the research participant.
Id.
104 The exome is the part of the genome formed by exons, the portions of
genes that are expressed in the form of synthesized proteins and other functional gene
products. It is often described as the functional or coding portion of the genome,
despite increasing recognition that regions of the genome that do not directly code for
proteins are functionally significant. For the human genome, the exome is estimated
to comprise approximately 1.5% of the total genome. See Pauline C. Ng et al.,
Genetic Variation in an Individual Human Exome, PLoS GENETICS, August 2008, at
1, available at http://www.plosgenetics.org/article/fetchObjectAttachment.action?uri
=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pgen.1000160&representation=PDF.
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findings to some degree or may fail to reach a consensus, given the
rapid expansion of knowledge in the field.'io
Moreover, unless a researcher is a licensed physician, providing a
subject with interpretation of the subject's genomic sequence data
could easily exceed that researcher's expertise. As discussed in Part
III, researchers who share interpretative guidance with their subjects
also risk running afoul of state statutes regulating genetic counseling
and the unauthorized practice of medicine. Researchers who share
clinically significant data with their research subjects, even when mo-
tivated only by a perceived moral or ethical obligation, could even
risk medical malpractice liability in state court.106
The longitudinal nature of many public genomics research
projects further complicates the issue. If permitted by the study pro-
tocol, researchers may obtain express consent to recontact study par-
ticipants in the future. In such cases, what obligation - and at what
expense - does a researcher have to notify participants of subsequent
research or knowledge developments that imbue previously returned
genomic sequence data with new or altered clinical significance?
Expecting researchers to continuously monitor the clinical signific-
ance of new knowledge for all study participants would dramatically
increase the costs and legal risk of genomic research - likely prohibi-
tively.'0o
Yet the problem may not be a completely intractable one. The
PGP, for instance, has attempted to address this problem by providing
participants with a "Preliminary Research Report," a "non-
comprehensive list of genetic variants present in [the participant's]
DNA sequence data that are currently believed by the PGP to
be of significance in clinical practice." 08  The PGP provides the
Preliminary Research Report alongside prominent explanations of its
limitations, including that it should not to be used for any clinical or
medical purpose and will not be updated on an ongoing basis. In this
way, the PGP attempts to balance the desire of researchers to aid par-
ticipants in the basic interpretation and understanding of their genom-
ic data with the legal necessity of complying with professional, legal,
and financial realities that collectively prevent PGP researchers from
105 Genomic research projects take varying approaches to this issue. See
Coriell Personalized Med. Collaborative, Informed Cohort Oversight Board (ICOB),
http://cpmc.coriell.org/Sections/About/SAB.aspx?Pgld=51 (last visited May 3, 2010).
106 This concern is hypothetical at the moment. See generally Larry 1. Palmer,
Should Liability Play a Role in Social Control of Biobanks?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
89 (2005) (discussing possibility of such liability).
107 Murphy et al., supra note 41, at 37.
108 PGP CONSENT FORM, supra note 90, at § V, 4.2.
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playing a more active role in interpreting individual participant data.
If researchers are able to provide participants with some indication of
the clinical utility of the data - along with the raw data - without sub-
jecting themselves to legal liability or additional regulatory obstacles,
both participant and ethical concerns may be satisfied.
Of course, this entire issue may be moot before long. If technolo-
gical advances continue to drive down the cost of genomic sequenc-
ing, genomic sequencing could become an affordable commodity by
the end of this decade.109 If that is the case, individuals - of their own
accord or at the encouragement of their healthcare providers or insur-
ers - may routinely have their full genome sequenced as part of rou-
tine clinical care and in advance of their participation in any particular
genomic research project." 0 In that case, the burden of preparing
and interpreting genomic sequence data may largely shift from the
research to the clinical setting, significantly lessening participants'
reliance on researchers to interpret such data.
D. Legal Dimensions of Ethical and Social Issues
Public genomics has the potential to vastly expand our under-
standing of the interaction between genotype, phenotype and envi-
ronment and, in the process, to provide immense benefits to human
health, but it must deliver on that promise within the framework of the
law and in a manner that adheres to core ethical principles of human
subjects research. While most genomic researchers implicitly accept
this principle, few understand how the norms and guidelines of human
subjects research protection and the developing field of public genom-
ics intersect with the current legal regime. For example, if study par-
ticipants provide informed consent to public genomics research only
by understanding the magnitude of both known and unknown risks of
participation, then negligence or medical malpractice actions tried
before a state court judge accustomed to acting with the benefit of
hindsight (including knowledge of risks unknown at the time of con-
sent that have since become manifest) present public genomics re-
searchers with a potentially serious litigation risk. To take another
example, state direct-to-consumer genetic testing statutes,"' intended
09 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
110 Then again, even with a substantial additional drop in the cost of
genomic sequencing, it is not yet a given that a whole-genome sequence will become
a standardized part of routine clinical activity. See, e.g., Dan Vorhaus, The
Genome In Silico and the Future of Whole-Genome Sequencing, GENOMIcS L.
REP., July 27, 2009, http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/07/27/
the-genome-in-silico-and-the-future-of-whole-genome-sequencing/.
11 For examples, see infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
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to protect consumers from harm due to unregulated or unprofessional
medical services, may cast their nets wide enough to sweep in public
genomic research projects, even those not intended to target consum-
ers or provide clinical analysis to participants or healthcare providers.
But no matter how robust the self-reflection and self-regulation,
risk-free public genomic research simply does not exist. With that in
mind, the object of researchers and regulators, consistent with the
fundamental ethical norm of beneficence to subjects, should be to
develop research projects and legal frameworks that acknowledge and
responsibly address the risks and rewards of public genomics. A va-
riety of legal structures have evolved to balance the costs and benefits
of general scientific research, but the novel social and policy issues of
public genomics threaten to disrupt that legal-scientific equilibrium.
In the final Part of this Article, we sketch the characteristics of a new
normative, legal, and regulatory framework designed to enable public
genomics research while simultaneously protecting the rights of its
participants. To modify a legal regime that currently does neither,
however, requires an understanding of that regime.
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME
Because issues of privacy, informed consent, and the clinical sig-
nificance of genomic data implicate a wide range of statutory and
common law issues, the legal regime presently governing public ge-
nomics resists easy categorization. In some cases, as with state sta-
tutes governing research data privacy, public genomics research falls
within the intended scope of coverage. In other cases, as with medical
malpractice or regulation of direct-to-consumer genomic service pro-
viders, public genomics falls only incidentally within the application
of a particular legal or regulatory regime. In all cases, however, the
indeterminacy and inconsistency of the existing legal structure fails to
adequately protect research subjects while posing severe risks to the
progress of responsible public genomics.
This Part examines the shortcomings of the prevailing legal struc-
ture governing public genomics from the standpoint of previously
identified policy issues. The goal is not to provide a comprehensive
overview of the legal landscape but rather to illustrate the ways in
which the current legal regime is incompatible with public genomics.
Beginning with federal law, this Part considers some of the various
statutes and regulations relevant to public genomics research. Next,
the common law doctrines that courts may find useful in tort cases
involving public genomics researchers and research projects are eva-
luated. Finally, this Part concludes that the scattered, ad-hoc regulato-
ry approach adopted by both state and federal agencies is inconsistent
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with the legitimate goals of responsible public genomics research and,
in many cases, the policy interests underlying the current legal regime
itself.
A. Statutes and Regulations
Both state and federal legislatures have addressed issues affecting
public genomics research, most notably in the areas of participant
privacy, informed consent, and the regulation of the practice of medi-
cine. International law has also played an important role in shaping
ethical and normative understandings of the permissible bounds of
human subjects research.
1. Federal Law
At the federal level, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008 (GINA) 12 represents the most comprehensive effort thus
far to regulate the use of genetic information. GINA bars discrimina-
tion on the basis of genetic information by health insurance companies
and employers. Because GINA will not become effective until im-
plementing regulations are enacted," 3 it is difficult to ascertain exact-
ly how, if at all, its passage will directly impact public genomics.
More important than any direct impact, however, is the public mes-
sage conveyed by GINA's passage, including the reassurance that
information altruists may need to willingly participate in public ge-
nomics research.
Given public concern with discrimination on the basis of genetic
information,"l 4 GINA may provide certain study participants with
some limited comfort that their genetic information, should it become
112 Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
1.. Title I of GINA (Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance) took
effect one year after the effective date of enactment, May 21, 2008. See Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 §§ 101(f), 102(d), 103(f), 104(c), 105(b) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). Title II of GINA (Prohibiting Employment Discrimination on the Basis of
Genetic Information) will take effect eighteen months after the effect date of enact-
ment. § 213.
114 See, e.g., GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., U.S. PUBLIC OPINION ON
USES OF GENETIC INFORMATION AND GENETIC DISCRIMINATION (2007),
available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/reportpdfs/GINAPublicOpinion
Genetic InformationDiscrimination.pdf (concluding that "[nicarly all Americans
believe that health insurers and employers should not be able to deny or limit insur-
ance coverage or to make decisions about hiring and promotion based on genetic tests
results about their risk of future disease" and that "[t]hree of every four Americans
support a law forbidding genetic discrimination by health insurers and employers.").
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identified, cannot be used to discriminate against them in the context
of health insurance or employment. Unfortunately, GINA is non-
comprehensive in several key respects, failing to prohibit the use of
genetic information in setting rates or determining coverage for life,
disability, or long-term care insurance."' Moreover, while GINA's
passage makes certain forms of genetic discrimination illegal, it can-
not ensure that genetic discrimination will not occur in the future. For
these reasons, some commentators view GINA's limited protections
as doing more harm than good, especially insofar as these protections
encourage unwarranted individual reliance on the law.' Nonethe-
less, GINA represents both an important step towards the protection
of participants in public genomics research and a potential model,
both good and bad, for future, more comprehensive legislation against
genetic discrimination.
Proposed and pending federal legislation, although increasingly
recognizing the challenges and opportunities presented by the field of
genomics, brings little clarity. One of the most high-profile pieces of
proposed legislation is the Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act
(the "GPMA"), which was introduced into the U.S. Senate in 2006
and 2007. The GPMA was most recently introduced into the House
of Representatives in 2008,' '7 where it stalled in the Ways and Means
Committee. The GPMA contemplates the creation of a Personalized
Medicine Interagency Working Group (IWG) charged with the crea-
"s See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Is GINA Worth the Wait?, 36 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 174, 174 (2008) (discussing the "essential issues of discrimination and disclo-
sure of genetic information in health insurance and employment that GINA does not
address"); Amy L. McGuire & Mary Anderlik Majumder, Two Cheers for GINA?, I
GENOME MED. 6.1, 6.2 (2009); OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON THE GENETIC INFORMATION
NONDISCRIMINATION ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTIGATORS AND INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARDS (2009), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/ginal
html.
116 See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative
Pragmatism, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59, 63 (2007) (arguing that GINA may "lead the
public to rely on the law to their detriment. It may also encourage people to believe
in genetic exceptionalism, thereby making it a self-fulfilling prophesy, and it may
erroneously convince legislators that they have resolved the underlying issues, there-
by delaying enactment of meaningful legislation."). For this reason, the PGP streng-
thened its precautionary language regarding the risk of genetic discrimination follow-
ing the passage of GINA. For this very reason the PGP strengthened the precautio-
nary language contained in its informed consent agreements regarding the risk of
genetic discrimination following the passage of GINA.
117 See, e.g., S. 976, 1 10th Cong. (2007); S.3822, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R.
6498, 110th Cong. (2008).
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tion of a national biobank, or the provision of national funding for
non-governmental biobanks such as the one begun by the PGP." 8
Under the GPMA, the IWG must "develop[] and promulgat[e]
guidelines regarding procedures, protocols, and policies for the safe-
guarding of the privacy of biobank subjects. . . ."ll 9 The GPMA also
contemplates the award of grants to biobanking initiatives, provided
they comply with the IWG's regulations and, as a separate require-
ment, "establish mechanisms to ensure patient privacy and protection
of information . . . ."120 The GPMA presupposes that privacy is not
only possible, but of paramount importance.12' As discussed in Part
II, this assumption is frequently incompatible with the public genom-
ics model. Equally important, although the GPMA purports to "en-
courage development of genomic tests and therapies; and [to pay]
greater attention to the quality of genetic tests, direct-to-consumer
advertising and the use of personal genomic information," 22 it fails to
distinguish between research, clinical and commercial genetic testing.
More broadly, the increasing availability of genomic data is driv-
ing the development of a range of genomic activities. These include
genomic research, use of genomic data in clinical care and commer-
cial genetic testing and other genomic services targeted at consumers
(as opposed to patients or healthcare providers). Increasingly, the
distinctions between research, clinical care and consumer products are
becoming blurred. Thus, enabling public genomic research will re-
quire appropriate distinctions between the generation and return of
genomic data in the research, clinical and commercial contexts, in-
cluding distinguishing public genomics research from other forms of
non-public genomic research.12 3 Federal regulation to date misses this
118 Id.
"9 H.R. 6948, § 4(b)(5) (emphasis added).
120 Id. § 5(c)(3)(G).
121 This is consistent with other national legislative efforts, including the UK
Biobank project. See UK Biobank, Confidentiality, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/
faqs/confidentiality.php (last visited May 3, 2010); Untersuchungen bei Menschen
[Human Genetic Examination Act] 374/09 (Apr. 24, 2009),
http://www.eurogentest.org/uploads/1247230263295/GenDGGerman English.pdf
(providing a translation of the act).
122 The GPMA "focuses on the safety, efficacy and availability of information
about genetic tests, including pharmacogenetic and pharmacogenomics tests." These
and other provisions are meant to aid in paying "greater attention to the quality of
genetic tests, direct-to-consumer advertising and use of personal genomic informa-
tion." 153 Cong. Rec. S3709 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 2007) (statement of Sen. Obama).
123 See, e.g., Dan Vorhaus, Genomic Research Goes DTC, GENOMICS
L. REP., July 9, 2009, http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/07/09/
genomic-research-goes-dtc/.
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mark, and as described in the next section, the scene at the state level
is not much better.
Finally, although not specific to genomic research, protections
applicable to human subjects research must also be included in any
list of federal laws affecting public genomics. In the United States,
the "Common Rule" is the definitive standard for human subjects re-
search.12 4 The Common Rule grew out of a series of regulations from
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that was later
adopted by a number of Federal departments and agencies. While not
perfectly comprehensive or preemptive, because it does not cover
every Federal agency and does not cover certain privately sponsored
research,125 the Common Rule does apply to "all research involving
human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regula-
tion by a federal department or agency" that has adopted it.126 Al-
though the cost of sequencing an individual genome is falling quickly,
the large cohorts sought by many public genomics projects means that
research costs remain high, with researchers generally seeking federal
support. Moreover, genomic researchers are frequently associated
with research universities and other institutions that have signed Fed-
eral-wide Assurances, which are institution-wide agreements to comp-
ly with Common Rule protections on all research projects, regardless
of whether any individual project receives federal funds. According-
ly, most public genomics projects will be subject to the Common
Rule.127
124 The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects is often referred
to as the "Common Rule" and is codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.124 (2008). The
Common Rule sets forth fundamental human subjects research protections (HSRP)
for almost all government-funded research in the United States, and most academic
and other research institutions require compliance with the Common Rule regardless
of the source of founding. While the Common Rule supplies a floor and not a ceiling
for HSRP, there appears to be little evidence of state or local lawmakers exercising
their authority to "provide additional protections for human subjects." See § 46.101 (f)
(2008).
125 Vorhaus, supra note 123. While most DTC genomic research is not, at
this point in time, covered by the Common Rule or similar regulations, research con-
ducted by pharmaceutical, medical device and other companies subject to FDA regu-
lation, although not covered by the Common Rule, is subject to FDA human subject
protection regulations that closely track the Common Rule. See generally U.S. Food
& Drug Administration, Comparison of FDA and HHS Human Subject
Protection Regulations, http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/Running
ClinicalTrials/EducationalMaterials/ucml 12910.htm (last visited May 3, 2010).
126 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2008).
127 To the extent that a new DTC research model develops and proves to be
sustainable, certain public genomics projects may not be covered, at least initially, by
existing human subjects research protections, including the Common Rule. Any such
gap in coverage for research participants would be addressed, eventually, by legisla-
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Compliance with the Common Rule is the responsibility of "each
institution engaged in research which is covered by [the] policy."l 2 8
At most institutions, responsibility for Common Rule and other hu-
man subjects research compliance falls to an Institutional Review
Board (IRB), and the institution is required to "certify that each appli-
cation or proposal for research covered by the assurance . . . has been
reviewed and approved by the IRB,"l 2 9 the composition and opera-
tions of which is also spelled out in the Common Rule.130 The Office
for Human Research Protection (OHRP), a division of HHS, reviews
institutional compliance with the Common Rule. While the OHRP
has the authority to investigate reported violations of the Common
Rule and, in limited cases, to undertake "not-for-cause compliance
oversight evaluations,"'31 the federal government does not conduct
any initial review or approval of human subjects research projects.
This task has been left exclusively to the individual IRBs.
Under the Common Rule, the level of IRB supervision corres-
ponds to the level of risk that a project presents to its human
subjects,132 with a conception of "risk" that generally involves the
likelihood of physical injury to study participants.133 Because public
genomics is non-therapeutic, physical risks to participants are low.
Under a broader conception of risk, however, participants in public
genomics research face the possibility of significant adverse conse-
quences from their participation. These adverse consequences include
social harms and other risks that are difficult to forecast, and thus to
proscribe. For example, participants of childbearing age risk disclos-
ing to potential spouses that they carry genes associated with an in-
creased risk of developing diseases such as Huntington's disease,
tive and regulatory action, likely by extending the Common Rule (or a close analo-
gue) to DTC or other private or commercial research activities.
128 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a) (2008).
129 § 46.103(f) (2008).130 See, e.g., IRB Membership, § 46.107 (2008); IRB Functions and Opera-
tions, § 46.108 (2008); IRB Review of Research, § 46.109 (2008); Criteria for IRB
Approval of Research, § 46.111 (2008).
1' 42 U.S.C. § 289(b) (2006).
132 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e) (2008) ("An IRB shall conduct continuing
review of research covered by this policy at intervals appropriate to the degree of risk
. . . ."); § 46.116(a)(6) (placing more stringent informed consent requirements upon
projects exposing subjects to more than minimal risk).
'3 See, e.g., § 46.102(i) ("Minimal risk means that the probability and magni-
tude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of them-
selves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests."); but see § 46.101 (b)(2)(ii)
(discussing research that "could be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, em-
ployability, or reputation").
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Alzheimer's disease, or breast cancer that could have been inherited
by their children or be passed along to future children. Such risks can
be mitigated - in the case of the PGP, participants are given the option
to withdraw from the study after receipt of their results but prior to
publicationl 34 - but only as to genes that are identified and whose
function is understood at that particular point in time. Indeed, as pre-
viously discussed, the most significant risks to participants in public
genomics research may be presently unknown. Accordingly, while
the Common Rule plays an important role in protecting human re-
search subjects, its limited conception of risk leaves it ill-equipped to
protect human subjects and guide public genomics investigators in
conducting responsible research.
2. State Law
As the clinical and commercial applications of genomic research
become more widespread, state legislatures have also jumped into the
fray, enacting a morass of widely varying regulations. While state
legislation presents a challenge to genomic research in many forms,
the problem is especially acute with regard to public genomics in
areas ranging from privacy to the unauthorized practice of medicine.
a. Regulation of DTC Genomic Service Providers
The sentiment behind much of the legislation directly applicable
to public genomics involves licensing and disclosure requirements
motivated by suspicion of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genonic servic-
es, including genetic testing. DTC service providers usually reach
consumers through the Internet, television, or in some cases, over-the-
counter, with the consumer providing a tissue or fluid sample and
returning it to a laboratory for testing.'13  The company then provides
the customer with individualized information about that person's ge-
netic heritage, paternity, or propensity for certain traits or diseases.
DTC genomic companies vary in the degree to which they interact
directly with consumers and patients or rely on genetic counselors,
physicians, or other healthcare professionals to mediate that relation-
ship.136
134 PGP CONSENT FORM, supra note 90, at § V, 4.3.
1s Fed. Trade Comm'n, At-Home Genetic Tests: A Healthy Dose of Skeptic-
ism May Be the Best Prescription, available at http://www.fic.gov/bcp/edu/
pubs/consumer/health/hea02.pdf (last visited May 3, 2010).
136 Examples of the former include 23andMe and Pathway Genomics, which
return results directly to individuals via a website interface. Examples of the latter
include Navigenics, Knome, and Illumina which, while returning information directly
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Public genomics projects in which a participant provides a tissue
or fluid sample to be sequenced in a laboratory, frequently without
consultation with a physician, would likely qualify as a DTC service
or test under many legislative definitions.' 37  Because DTC testing
often removes one-on-one professional counseling and associated
safeguards, a great deal of public concern has been voiced about the
use of DTC testing in complex medical practice areas such as genet-
ics 138ics.
Public genomics projects and other biobanking organizations, un-
like DTC service providers, do not collect or sell - or conduct re-
search using - genomic data for commercial benefit. And yet, despite
their non-commercial focus, and despite robust informed consent
procedures and existing human subjects research protections that
comprehensively address the concerns underlying DTC statutes, legis-
lation governing DTC clinical tests fails to acknowledge those distinc-
to individuals, rely on healthcare professions to mediate at least one key stage (either
ordering or receiving and interpreting) of the process.
137 Both California and New York, for instance, took regulatory action against
DTC testing and service providers in 2008 for their alleged failure to appropriately
involve a physician or meet other clinical or regulatory requirements. See, e.g.,
Robert Langreth & Matthew Herper, States Crack Down on Online Gene
Tests, FORBES.COM, Apr. 4, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/17/genes-regula
tion-testing-biz-cx mh bl 0418genes.html.
138 See Leslie Pray, DTC Genetic Testing: 23andMe, DNA Direct and Gene-
lex, I NATURE EDUc. (2008), available at http://www.nature.com/scitable/
topicpage/DTC-Genetic-Testing-23andme-DNA-Direct-and-674; see also Howard
Wolinsky, Do-It-Yourself Diagnosis, 6 EMBO REP. 805, 806-07 (2005) (discussing
the benefits and risks of DTC testing); Meredith Wadman, Gene-Testing Firms Face
Legal Battle, 453 NATURE 1148 (2008) (discussing the legal battle over DTC testing
in New York and California). Critics of direct-to-consumer genetic testing are con-
cerned that the results of genetic tests are not as accurate as the public perceives them
to be, and fear that customers might "make unwarranted, and even irrevocable, deci-
sions on the basis of test results and associated information, such as the decision to
terminate a pregnancy, to forgo needed treatment, or to pursue unproven therapies."
Kathy Hudson et al., Am. Soc'y of Human Genetics, ASHG Statement on Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Testing in the United States, 81 AM. J. Hum. GENETICS 635, 635-
36 (2007); Barbara Ameer & Norberto Krivoy, Direct-to-Consumer/Patient Advertis-
ing of Genetic Testing: A Position Statement of the American College of Clinical
Pharmacology, 49 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 886, 888 (2009). Accordingly, much
of the existing and proposed state legislation requires licensing and disclosure and/or
the involvement of physicians or other healthcare professionals to ensure paying
consumers of genetic testing are not duped or led to believe the results of such tests
are more predictive than they actually are. Unfortunately, depending on how such
legislation is drafted, it may be a fairly simple task to circumvent certain require-
ments, for example a physician involvement requirement, by simply structuring the
service model to accommodate the legislation which serves to satisfy the letter but not
the spirit of the requirement, while simultaneously creating additional administrative
expenses for companies, individuals and states.
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tions. Most state statutes appear to assume that any direct interaction
between individuals and a genomic activity involves clinical genetic
testing. As of May 2008, thirteen states prohibited all DTC testing.139
Of the twelve states that allowed limited DTC testing, many of them
permitted only extremely specific, non-genetic tests, thereby implicit-
ly banning DTC genetic tests altogether.14 0
This failure to recognize the distinction between clinical and
research applications has the potential to subject public genomics
research to incidental regulation under clinically focused laws. For
example, Idaho's outright prohibition on DTC testing precludes the
ordering of tests by anyone other than "practitioners legally autho-
rized to diagnose, treat and prescribe."'41 This regulation, while in-
tended to prevent unauthorized access to clinical testing, lacks the
nuanced understanding of commercial, clinical, and research genom-
ics necessary to produce efficient and targeted regulation of DTC test-
ing. Indeed, despite the fact that the Idaho regulations appear to be
directed at the clinical concerns caused by DTC testing, state officials
have confirmed that all DTC.testing is prohibited in Idaho.142
Ultimately, to the extent that DTC laws or regulations sweep up
true public genomics activity, they likely do so either unintentionally
or without a complete understanding of the distinctions between the
variety of existing genomic services and research. To avoid uninten-
tionally restricting the legitimate activities of responsible public ge-
nomics, more finely-tuned drafting and enforcement of existing and
future regulations is needed.
b. Licensing of Genetic Counselors and Physicians
Public genomics researchers who desire to share research results
with study participants face special difficulties in complying with
state laws, whether those laws are specific to DTC genomic services
or part of broader efforts to regulate genetic counseling and the prac-
139 Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr., Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Empo-
wering or Endangering the Public?, http://www.dnapolicy.org/policy.issue.php?action
=detail&issuebriefid=32 (last visited May 3, 2010) (discussing the dangers of false
or misleading advertising in the context of DTC testing).
140 See, e.g., MD. CODE REGs. 10.10.01.03B(28) (2009) (allowing DTC
"Health Awareness Tests," which are limited only to cholesterol screening).
1' IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.16.03.14.350.07 (emphasis added). Indeed, the
regulation assumes that tests will be ordered in the context of a doctor-patient rela-
tionship and that the test results will be incorporated into the patient's medical record.
142 Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr., Survey of Direct-to-Consumer Testing Sta-
tutes and Regulations, June 2007, available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/
DTCStateLawChart.pdf.
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tice of medicine. At least twelve states have enacted or considered
laws establishing licensure requirements for genetic counselors.143
Massachusetts, for example, defines the "practice of genetic counsel-
ing" to include "helping the individual ... understand genetic or pre-
natal tests . . . and interpret complex genetic test results."'" Would
investigators in a public genomics research project need to acquire
state genetic counseling licenses to share results with study partici-
pants in Massachusetts or other states where similar legislation has
been enacted? What level of information-sharing would trigger the
need to obtain such a license? What if the test results were based only
on a computerized analysis of the sequencing data and, other than the
variations in the data itself, were not otherwise tailored to the research
participant? At present, none of these questions have clear answers,
and public genomics researchers are left to balance the legal risks
against uncertain professional, ethical, and legal obligations to return
data to participants.
Sharing research data with participants also implicates state laws
that forbid the practice of medicine by unlicensed doctors, known as
the unauthorized practice of medicine.14 5 Violating the prohibition
against the unauthorized practice of medicine constitutes a misdemea-
nor or felony under most state medical practice acts. State medical
practice acts generally provide that a violation of the prohibition
against the unauthorized practice of medicine is a misdemeanor or
felony,14 6 and licensed physicians who aid the unauthorized practice
of medicine may be subject to disciplinary action. 14 Depending on
the phrasing of the law and the specifics of the research protocol, a
public genomics project that shares research data with participants
may arguably fall within the scope of the law. For example, in New
York, the practice of medicine is defined as "diagnosing, treating,
operating or prescribing for any human disease, pain, injury, deformi-
ty or physical condition." 4 8 Would the identification of a monogenic,
dominant condition - for example, Huntington's disease - constitute
the diagnosis of a disease or medical condition within the meaning of
143 ALISSA JOHNSON, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL
GENETICS BRIEF: GENETIC COUNSELOR LICENSING, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx
?tabid= 14276 (last visited May 3, 2010).
'" MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 227 (2009).
145 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-18 (2009) ("No person shall perform any
act constituting the practice of medicine . . . without being duly licensed and regis-
tered.").
14 See, e.g., id.; MINN. STAT. § 147.091(1)(i) (2009); GA. CODE § 43-34-
37(a)(9) (2008).
147 See, e.g., 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 60/22 (2008).
148 N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 6521 (Gould 2001).
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such statutes? Because activities that involve diagnosis may be consi-
dered the unauthorized practice of medicine, a public genomics
project could be found to be "practicing medicine" if it shared its find-
ings with participants.
c. Genetic Privacy
Finally, a number of states directly regulate the privacy of genetic
and genomic information. In most cases, state legislation simply re-
quires informed consent before an individual's genetic information
may be shared with a third party. For example, Minnesota law pro-
vides that genetic data "may be disseminated only with the individu-
al's written informed consent."149 Accordingly, a research protocol
that complies with the Common Rule would also likely comply
with this law. Other state laws governing disclosure are not so clear.
California, for instance, requires written authorization "for each sepa-
rate disclosure of the test results, and shall include to whom the
disclosure would be made."' 50 This language clearly contemplates
private (i.e., consumer or clinical) genetic testing, but how would it
apply to public genomics research? When an individual's genomic
data is published to a public Web site, as with the PGP, what consti-
tutes a "disclosure"? Is a disclosure the act of placing the information
on a public server? Does a disclosure occur each time a visitor to the
Web site access the information? Would a statement that the disclo-
sure is being made to the world at large satisfy the requirement that
the written authorization "include to whom" the information is being
disclosed, or is something more specific required?'5 '
149 MINN. STAT. § 13.386(3)(4) (2009).
Iso CAL. INS. CODE § 10149.1(g). Violations of this statute are punishable
by a civil penalty of between one and five thousand dollars, plus court costs. The
California authorization is similar to that imposed by the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) at 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c) (2008). With respect to
HIPAA, the so-called "Privacy Rule," which took effect in 2003, regulates the use
and disclosure of certain medical data by "covered entities." § 164.501. Although
the "protected health information" covered by the Privacy Rule certainly encompasses
the information received and published by most DTC genomic service providers and
genomic research projects, the term "covered entity" includes health care providers,
health care clearinghouses and health plans and a health care provider "furnishes,
bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of business." § 160.103; see also
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
COVERED ENTITY CHARTS, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HIPAAGenInfo/Downloads/
CoveredEntitycharts.pdf (last visited May 3, 2010). It is doubtful that, at least under
current interpretations, either commercial or research genomic entities of the type
generally described in this Article would be covered by HIPAA's Privacy Rule or by
HIPAA, generally.
1s1 Statutes that require authorizations to take a particular form or meet spe-
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Even more troubling for public genomics is a complete bar
against any disclosure. Under Georgia law, "genetic testing may only
be conducted to obtain information for therapeutic or diagnostic pur-
poses."l52 The legislature included an exception for scientific re-
search, but with the limitation that "any research facility may conduct
genetic testing and may use the information derived from genetic test-
ing for scientific research purposes so long as the identity of any indi-
vidual tested is not disclosed to any third party .. .. s3 The law pro-
vides no apparent exception for disclosure with informed consent.
The nuances, ambiguities, and outright prohibitions created by
state legislative activity create significant hurdles for the progress of
public genomics, rendering compliance extremely difficult in the
large, multi-state research protocols typical of such research. While
many of these laws apparently target clinical testing, research-oriented
initiatives such as the PGP are loathe to run afoul of the plain lan-
guage of state law for obvious reasons, including their reliance on
public funding, their desire to carry out research responsibly, and their
inability to shoulder ancillary expenses such as compliance penalties
or litigation expenses. Yet few if any research budgets account for the
costs of ensuring legal and regulatory compliance. In any case, public
genomics projects should be able to conduct research with something
more concrete than a mere hope that, if and when an issue arises, the
state enforcement agency will adopt a lenient interpretation of the
relevant statute, regulation, or rule. Until a broader regulatory scheme
clarifies the parameters of permissible genomics research in the vari-
ous state jurisdictions, the absence of predictable legal outcomes may
discourage or even preclude research-oriented projects from operating
in certain states. Significant genetic populations and their data will be
excluded from participation in public genomics research, biasing the
results and depressing enrollment numbersl 54 while simultaneously
failing to fully protect research subjects.
cialized prescriptions present a similar problem. For example, Alaska law provides
for a state-authored consent form. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(c) (2008) ("The
Department of Health and Social Services may by regulation adopt a uniform in-
formed and written consent form to assist persons in meeting the requirements of this
section.").
152 GA. CODE ANN. §33-54-3(a) (2005).
153 § 33-54-6 (emphasis added).
154 Although the PGP has not had this problem to date, at least one other
large-scale genomic research project, a collaborative project between the Scripps
Translational Science Institute and the DTC genomics company Navigenics, has had
difficulty meeting its target enrollment numbers. See Daniel MacArthur, Enrollment
in Navigenics-Scripps Study Disappointing, GENETIC FUTURE, http://scienceblogs
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3. International Law
Although international law generally does not bind either
researchers or regulators to follow particular standards in conducting
genetic research, it has played a critical role in the development of
ethical understandings of human subjects research and is a key
component of responsible public genomics. The Nuremberg Code, a
set of ethical principles intended to guide research involving human
subjects, has played an especially important role.' 55 Drafted by the
American judges who tried twenty-three Nazi doctors and researchers
for crimes against humanity, including grotesque experiments that
exposed concentration camp prisoners to mustard gas and freezing
temperatures, the Nuremberg Code sets forth a series of ethical
principles governing research on human subjects.' 56  Voluntary
consent is "absolutely essential," and obtaining consent is the
"personal duty and responsibility" of the researcher.15 7 As with the
Common Rule, proportionality principles that balance potential harms
and gains also play an important role in the Nuremberg Code.158
Other important international law statements on human subjects
research include the World Medical Association's Declaration of
Helsinki,159 a nonbinding but highly influential set of ethical
principles for human subjects research, and the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights.160  Although these
principles lack binding force in the United States, courts faced with
cases involving human research subjects have looked to the
Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki to guide their
analysis.' 6 ' In addition to guiding courts faced with litigation involv-
.com/geneticfuture/2009/02/enrollment-in-navigenics-scrip.php (last visited May 3,
2010).
1ss See NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 87, at 181.
116 See, e.g., NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
RESEARCH, DIRECTIVES FOR HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: NUREMBERG CODE,
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html (last visited May 3, 2010).
'" See NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 87, at 181-82.
'" See id. at 182 ("The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that
determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the expe-
riment."). Other key principles involve protecting research subjects from harm and
justifying experiments by their expected result.
159 World Med. Ass'n, World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki:
Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, IT 20, 22, Oct.
2008, available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/index.html.
160 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 1.L.M. 368 (stating "[N]o one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.").
161 See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 835 (Md. 2001)
370 HEAL TH MIA TRIX [Vol. 20:325
ENABLING RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC GENOMICS
ing human research subjects, the ethical norms embodied in these
international documents will likely play a role in structuring future
international agreements or domestic regulations. Because these in-
ternational norms also emphasize research subject privacy, they also
raise concerns for public genomics similar to those discussed with
regard to federal and state legislation.
In the specific area of genomic research, the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) published
the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights
in 1997162 and the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data
in 2003.163 Both of these nonbinding statements set forth principles
intended to govern genomic research and recognize the ways that the
particular attributes of genomic data impact issues of research ethics.
The Declaration on Human Genetic Data, for example, accords human
genomic data a special status because it "may contain information the
significance of which is not necessarily known at the time of the col-
lection of the biological samples" and "may have a significant impact
on the family, including offspring, extending over generations, and in
some instances on the whole group to which the person concerned
belongs." 16 The 2003 Declaration also contains useful protections for
research subjects, including the principle that "no one should be de-
nied access to his or her own genetic data.. .. "6 While the Declara-
tion does not bind the United States, other countries may look to it for
guidance, and state courts may consider the principles it elucidates in
deciding cases involving public genomics research, much as they have
done with the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki.
(holding that the Nuremberg Code "should be the preferred standard for assessing the
legality of scientific research on human subjects"); cf Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.
3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (determining that the Nuremberg Code and Declaration of
Helsinki are evidence of an international norm against nonconsensual human experi-
mentation).
162 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights,
UNESCO, 29th sess., 26th plen. mtg. (Nov. I1, 1997), available at
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URLID=13177&URL DO=DOTOPIC&URL
SECTION=201.html.
163 International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, UNESCO, 32d sess.,
20th plen. mtg. (Oct. 16, 2003), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL
ID=17720&URL DO=DOTOPIC&URL SECTION=201.html
'64 Id. art. 4.
165 Id. art. 13. This requirement is in tension with the potential legal liabili-
ties, discussed earlier in this Part, associated with the return of individualized genom-
ic data.
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B. Common Law
Researchers in the field of public genomics must also consider the
role that courts may play in answering the difficult policy questions
posed by this developing field. While some state laws governing ge-
nomic information specifically provide a private right of action for
their violation,'66 most litigation related to public genomics will likely
be based on tort law claims such as researcher negligence or medical
malpractice. As discussed in Part H, participants in public genomics
research face a variety of risks, many of which cannot be articulated at
the time participants consent to join the study. When these risks are
realized and a participant is harmed - an outcome that is statistically
likely in public genomic projects with large numbers of participants -
the form of any resulting litigation will likely depend upon the form of
the harm, neither of which can be known in advance.
When a participant in a public genomics project becomes sick or
dies as a result of a condition with an identified genetic component,
medical malpracticel 6 7 litigation could result. The theory would be
that the physician-researchers owed a duty of due care to the partici-
pant as a "patient," which they breached by failing to discover the
condition or disclose it to the participant. The primary barrier to a
plaintiffs claim for medical malpractice liability would be the re-
quirement that the plaintiff show the existence of a physician-patient
relationship that imposes a duty of care. While researchers have gen-
erally been considered outside the scope of medical malpractice
claims,16 1 the nature of genomic data may change a court's analysis.
From an ethical standpoint, providing participants with a preliminary
interpretation of their raw genomic data, as the PGP does, provides
usable information to research subjects, encourages participation, and
aids in satisfying the researchers' ethical and legal duties to return
16 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.020 (2008) (providing civil right of action
against a person who collects, analyzes, or discloses the results of a DNA sample in
violation of Alaska's genetic testing laws).
167 Different states permit different claims, and "medical malpractice" claims
might also come in the form of any of the following: wrongful death action, wrongful
pregnancy action, wrongful birth action, wrongful life action, infliction of emotional
distress, and even negligence. Note that some courts have opined that certain medical
malpractice actions, such as the action for wrongful birth following negligent genetic
testing or for the failure to diagnose fetal defect, do not fall under traditional tort
analysis and rather involve matters of public policy better left to legislature. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Dogra, 844 N.E.2d 1190 (Ohio 2006).
168 See Ande v. Rock, 647 N.W.2d 265 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
parents suing physician-researchers for failing to disclose that their newborn tested
positive for cystic fibrosis failed to allege any physician-patient relationship between
themselves and physician-researchers).
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and/or interpret data in certain contexts. Yet by returning or interpret-
ing genomic data, a researcher may mitigate one form of potential
liability while exacerbating another, as the researcher's decision to
provide analysis of raw genomic data blurs the conceptual divide be-
tween non-clinical research and the practice of medicine.169
A participant-plaintiff could claim a physician-patient relationship
with an investigator in a public genomics project, or that a genetic
counselor associated with the project - perhaps put in place precisely
to satisfy a duty to provide guidance to participants receiving research
results - should be liable for the participant-plaintiff's harms, depend-
ing on the exact interactions between the genetic counselor and the
participant-plaintiff. Possible claims here include the failure to be
properly informed about available follow-up genetic tests, especially
in the cases where further diagnostic testing would be required to
determine the nature and extent of a fetal defect or other significant
disease;1 70 failure to diagnose and/or discover an inheritable genetic
impairment;17 1 failure to give sufficient or adequate genetic counsel-
ing, including ascertainment of carrier status; failure to timely refer a
participant to a genetic specialist; and loss of chance.17 2 Although
169 Refusing to return data to participants does not resolve the issue, especial-
ly in states where the legislature has enacted legislation making an individual's genet-
ic data his or her personal property. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 10-3-l104.7(1)(a)
(2006) ("Genetic information is the unique property of the individual to whom the
information pertains."). And returning data without any interpretation whatsoever
presents its own difficulties, as described in Part 11.
170 For example, Maryland recognizes a cause of action in tort:
for wrongful birth when the doctor does not inform the patient about availa-
ble diagnostic tests which might reveal the possibility of neural tube defects
of the fetus, when these defects are genetically caused, when further diag-
nostic testing would be required to determine the nature and extent of any
fetal defects, and when the plaintiff asserts she would have aborted child
had she been made aware of the fetal deformities.
Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1146-52 (Md. 1993) (quoting Reed v.
Campagnolo, 810 F.Supp. 167, 172-73 (D. Md. 1993)); see also Ferrell v.
Rosenbaum, 691 A.2d 641 (D.C. 1997) (finding that a physician-geneticist
breached applicable standard of care by failing to review and follow up on in-
formation contained in child's medical records indicating abnormal blood test
results where the failure to timely diagnose lead to harm. By the time diagnosis
was made, mother-plaintiff and father were estranged, and therefore, geneticist's
negligence robbed mother-plaintiff of the opportunity to conceive additional
children who might serve as bone marrow donors for the sick child.).
1' See Chen v. Connors, 896 N.E.2d 656 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that
a physician's alleged failure to evaluate a patient as a potential thalassemia carrier
was not a clear deviation from good medical practice where the physician was not a
genetic counselor and there was no record showing that the patient informed the phy-
sician that her twin sister was found to be a carrier for thalassemia).
172 The "loss of chance" doctrine involves issues of causation in medical
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some of these claims can be avoided with preemptive structuring on
the part of the public genomics project, 173 not all of these potential
claims are amenable to structural solutions. Furthermore, such struc-
tural changes restrict the universe of potential participants, introduc-
ing bias into the population and weakening the quality of the research
data generated by the project.
Depending on the specific facts of its particular research protocol,
a public genomics project has a variety of arguments in defense of its
structure, including the fact that there is no "patient" in the relation-
ship at all. Researchers could also argue that the plaintiff-participant
did not consult the public genomics project or the genetic counselor as
a health care provider; that the public genomics project and the genet-
ic counselor are not engaging in the practice of medicine; and that the
participant-plaintiff should not expect to receive medical services for
a medical condition. All of these defenses may be bolstered by the
informed consent protocols implemented by the project.17 4 Nonethe-
less, because the existence of a physician-patient relationship is ulti-
mately a question of fact for the jury,'7 1 public genomics projects face
substantial litigation risk related to medical malpractice claims, even
if those claims are ultimately rejected by the courts. Finally, even
frivolous or meritless litigation is extremely worrisome given the
shoestring budgets of many scientific research projects.
If the participant is unable to prove the existence of a physician-
patient relationship, researchers may still owe other common law du-
ties toward the project participants. State courts have only recently
begun to grapple with this issue, but at least one case suggests that
state courts may closely review the merits of research protocols in tort
suits brought by participants. In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute,
Inc., the Maryland Court of Appeals decided a case involving claims
malpractice claims. When a doctor fails to diagnose a condition and the patient is
injured, some courts hold that the doctor can be held liable in tort. See, e.g.,
Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Mass. 2008) (explaining "Where a
physician's negligence reduces or eliminates the patient's prospects for achieving a
more favorable medical outcome, the physician has harmed the patient and is liable
for damages. Permitting recovery for loss of chance is particularly appropriate in the
area of medical negligence.").
173 The PGP, for instance, initially declined to enroll individuals that had not
finished having children, in part to address such potential risks.
174 See, e.g., PGP CONSENT FORM, supra note 90, at § VII. (containing several
provisions designed to inform prospective participants that (i) data supplied by the
project is not intended or suitable for clinical or medical use, and (ii) the project will
not supply any clinical, health or medical care to project participants).
1' RICHARD E. SHANDELL & PATRICIA SMITH, THE PREPARATION AND TRIAL
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 1-2 (rev. ed. 1994).
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against researchers studying lead exposure in substandard housing in
Baltimore.17 6 The cost of mandatory lead abatement in Baltimore had
become more expensive than the rental value of some properties,
causing landlords to leave the properties vacant rather than to repair
them. 17 7  Researchers from Johns Hopkins decided to investigate
whether less costly abatement methods could allow the vacant units to
be returned to the housing stock.
The researchers devised a protocol under which they would pro-
vide subsidies to landlords to perform varying levels of lead abate-
ment, and then test the lead level in the residents' blood over a period
of five years.17 8 The researchers were especially interested in learning
the effects on young children, who are the most likely to ingest am-
bient lead. Although the researchers obtained informed consent forms
from the participants, authorizing the researchers to test the children's
blood and to measure levels of lead dust within the house,179 the in-
formed consent failed to "clearly disclose[] . . . that the researchers
contemplated that, as a result of the experiment, the child might ac-
cumulate lead in her blood, and that in order for the experiment to
succeed it was necessary that the child remain in the house as the lead
in the child's blood increased or decreased." 80 The lead levels in
some of the children's blood increased, and several of the parents sued
the researchers, arguing that the researchers breached a duty of care
owed to the human subjects to warn them about and fully abate the
lead in their homes, with consequent harm to the children.81
After an extended discussion of standards for human subjects
research, including the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of
Helsinki, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that "the very nature of
nontherapeutic scientific research on human subjects can, and normal-
ly will, create special relationships out of which duties arise."' 8 2 This
duty was justified in part because "the investigators are in a better
position to anticipate, discover, and understand the potential risks to
the health of their subjects" and should therefore be legally required to
inform the participants of dangers to their health that might arise from
time to time.'83 Furthermore, in addition to the duties in tort, the re-
searchers owed contract duties to the participants, because the in-
176 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 811-12 (Md. 2001).
" Id. at 821.
... Id. at 823.
'9 Id. at 824.
'g Id.
181 Id. at 832-33.
182 Id. at 834-35.
183 Id. at 85 1.
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formed consent form constituted a binding contract supported by con-
sideration.184 The court concluded that the informed consent in this
case had been insufficient because it did not inform the parents that
the children would ingest lead, that testing the degree of ingestion was
the entire point of the experiment, and that the child would have to
remain in the house for the entire study period for the experiment to
work. All the risks involved were clearly foreseeable to (and even
intended by) the researchers from the inception of the experiment. 85
The court also expressed doubt regarding the impartiality of the IRB,
which the court viewed as having helped the researchers avoid the
application of Common Rule provisions applicable to research involv-
ing children. 86
Viewed narrowly, Grimes is simply a case about informed con-
sent, holding that researchers, just like physicians with their patients,
must not expose their subjects to potential harm without their consent.
And it seems that the researchers in the case were deficient in this
regard, if they actually, as alleged, did not properly warn the partici-
pants and otherwise keep promises made to their subjects. Under this
reading, Grimes is similar to other existing human subject research
cases that examine whether the researchers obtained the participants'
informed consent.'8 7
The Grimes court, however, also seemed to assert a more expan-
sive authority - the authority to go beyond the issue of consent and
examine the validity of the research protocols themselves. The opi-
nion, for example, notes that "there are conflicting views in respect to
nontherapeutic research, as to whether consent, even of a person ca-
pable of consenting, can justify a research protocol that is otherwise
184 Id. at 818, 859. The contract holding was based on the fact that the parents
agreed to the testing in return for the test results and a small cash payment.
1 Id. at 844.
116 Id. at 814 ("[T]he IRB was willing to aid researchers in getting around
federal regulations designed to protect children used as subjects in nontherapeutic
research. An IRB's primary role is to assure the safety of human research subjects -
not help researchers avoid safety or health-related requirements."). Similar concerns
likely motivated the Harvard Medical School IRB's requirement that the PGP utilize a
separate Data Safety Monitory Board (DSMB) to "monitor the progress of the PGP,
including the risks to study participants," on an ongoing basis. PGP CONSENT FORM,
supra note 90, at §VII(1.6). The PGP's informed consent agreement also provides for
ongoing direct participant monitoring through the collection of regular (every three
months) "safety questionnaires" that attempt to assess, among other items, whether
participation has resulted in any adverse experiences. Id. at § VI(5).
'8' See Greenberg v. Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1070 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1467
(M.D.N.C. 1986).
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unjustifiable."188 The court also quoted at length from a law review
article that said:
This "justifying" side of consent raises some timeless and
thorny questions. What if people consent to activities and re-
sults which are repugnant, or even evil? . . . We have three
ways out: We can say, first, "Yes, consent justifies whatever
is consented to - you consented, so case closed;" second,
"This particular consent is deficient - you did not really con-
sent and so the result or action is not justified;" or third, "You
consented, but your consent cannot justify this action or re-
sult." 89
Although the Grimes court focuses mostly on the second approach,
the opinion leaves little doubt that the court believes that it is empo-
wered to examine the third, at least in research where children are
involved.190
This case raises the question of who should decide whether hu-
man subject research is justified, even in the presence of truly in-
formed consent to that research. Should the researchers themselves
decide, under the guidance of expert institutional review boards?
Should state courts play a role? The Grimes court left no doubt of its
position on this question, stating that "the assessment of the legal ef-
fect of research on human subjects must always be subject to judicial
evaluation."l 91 Indeed, throughout the opinion, the court illustrates
the tension between judicial and scientific evaluation of issues sur-
rounding human subjects research, noting that "to turn over human
and legal ethical concerns solely to the scientific community[] is to
risk embarking on slippery slopes, that all too often in the past, here
and elsewhere, have resulted in practices we, or any community,
should be ever unwilling to accept."' 92
188 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 856 (Md. 2001); see also
id at 848 (relying on a federal regulation that provided "[t]he research will be con-
ducted in accordance with sound ethical principles").
"9 Id. at 856-57 (quoting Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Hu-
man Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 458-60
(1996)); see also Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimenta-
tion and the Ethics ofAutonomy, 34 CATH. LAW. 455, 490 (1996).
190 See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 857 ("[N]o degree of parental consent, and no
degree of furnished information to the parents could make the experiment at issue
here, ethically or legally permissible. It was wrong in the first instance.").
191 Id. at 817.
192 Id. at 853.
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The institutional competence argument underlying Grimes - that
courts must have a role in determining ethical issues involving human
subjects research - has important implications for public genomics. A
participant in a public genomics project who suffered a negative con-
sequence, even one discussed in the informed consent materials and
explicitly acknowledge by the participant to be a risk, might be able to
sue the project if he or she can convince the court that the project was
"wrong in the first instance." 93 Researchers should also consider the
fact that a court's power is not limited to after-the-fact awards of
money damages - issues of validity could just as easily arise in a pro-
ceeding where an opponent of the research project sought to stop it by
obtaining a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
The likelihood of a court finding a particular research project unjusti-
fiable is unfortunately heightened by the novelty and uncertainty sur-
rounding public genomics and the challenge it brings to traditional
notions of research ethics. This problem is exacerbated by the fact
that the benefits of long-term scientific research (including public
genomics) may take years to become apparent, while the harms partic-
ipants are warned about (such as loss of a job or insurance) could take
place in the near future. Consequently, a state court confronted with a
near-term harm, and long-term but as-yet unrealized benefits, could be
inclined to find the research unjustifiable. As with federal and state
statutes and regulations therefore, common law adjudication of issues
raised by public genomics imposes serious and uncertain risks.
C. Problems with the Current Legal Regime
Most of the deficiencies of the current legal regime should now be
apparent. Much of the regulation is incidental, with genomic research
falling only accidentally within the coverage of laws governing medi-
cal practice or direct-to-consumer genomic services. Even when
regulation is intentionally directed towards genomic research, the
assumptions underlying that regulatory policy - for example, the
assumptions that anonymity or privacy are inviolate components of
any genomics research protocol - are often inconsistent with the pub-
lic genomics model.
Beyond the scope of any particular law or regulation, the fact that
each state has largely taken its own approach to regulating genomics
services and research is itself a serious problem. As with GINA, the
federal government generally endeavors to avoid preemption of state
law when it enacts federal laws, preferring instead to set a minimum
'9 Id. at 858.
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standard that states may expand upon as they see fit. While federal-
ism may support this approach in principle, the resulting patchwork of
regulation means that the compliance costs will be very high for any
public genomics projects with national or international ambitions.
Moreover, as demonstrated by Grimes, compliance with state and
federal law will not necessarily mitigate the legal risk faced by public
genomics projects.
Finally, among the most interesting questions raised by public ge-
nomics is how the current legal structure will handle problems that
researchers, regulators, or participants cannot anticipate. The risk that
an insurer will discriminate against an individual with a genetic pre-
disposition for a life-threatening condition, while difficult to quantify
precisely, represents a risk that everyone can grasp. But what of the
risks that no one has even considered? The existing legal structure,
which strains to accommodate even the known, present-day issues
presented by genomic research, lacks any mechanism to respond
promptly and effectively to new developments. Without both a con-
sensus understanding of the goals of public genomics - including the
permissible methods or practices for pursuing such goals - and a legal
regime flexible enough to adjust to unanticipated developments and
risks as they arise, public genomics research will be stymied by the
confusing, inconsistent morass that is the current legal regime.
IV. THE WAY FORWARD
While public genomics promises immense human benefit, it dif-
fers from traditional research models in ways that create a tension
among competing principles. How does one protect the legitimate
privacy expectations of individuals while engaging in research whose
benefits derive in part from broadly sharing individually identifiable
data? Can consent to participation be truly informed when the risks of
participation cannot be fully known? And at what point do efforts to
protect participants from risk violate the principles of individual au-
tonomy and respect?
Finding a way to enable a future of responsible public genomics
requires lawmakers and researchers to cooperatively develop a legal
and regulatory structure that protects participants while enabling
important scientific research to proceed in a responsible fashion. Re-
searchers must learn to cope with the legal duties imposed by regula-
tors, and regulators must adapt the present legal structure to the new
challenges presented by the advance of genomic research. The goal of
this Article is to explore these tensions, and to propose ways to har-
monize scientific and legal views on research ethics by providing
principles to guide the development of a new regulatory regime.
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This final Part articulates several key principles underlying a new
legal regime designed to enable responsible public genomics. These
principles are drawn from traditional notions of research ethics,
viewed from both the legal and scientific perspective and updated to
meet the challenges presented by genomics. They also represent an
effort to outline a broad conceptual framework and to encourage a
wider public discourse. This Article does not purport to offer positive
law solutions or to set forth a fully developed legal regime that re-
sponds to each of the questions; rather, it sketches a framework of
principles that present a way forward for public genomics.
A. Respect for Individual Participants
The principle that stands at the heart of responsible public genom-
ics is that no public genomics research project will ever succeed with-
out evincing the utmost respect for its participants. In the case of
competent adult' 94 subjects, researchers must have respect for the
safety and autonomy of subjects, and must diligently strive to protect
and to give life to that autonomy.'19 A core principle of such respect
is honesty. As noted by the Belmont Report, "[iun most cases of re-
search involving human subjects, respect for persons demands that
subjects enter into the research voluntarily and with adequate informa-
tion. In some situations, however, application of the principle is not
obvious." 96
Public genomics is just such a non-obvious situation. Our ignor-
ance dwarfs our knowledge in the field of genomics. Thus, in the case
of public genomics, "adequate information" requires that researchers
comprehensively and regularly consider the risks associated with their
work and pursue an honest and full disclosure of both known risks
and the fact that unknown risks exist. If the structure of a study's
protocol and research goals means that promises of privacy cannot be
honored, then such promises must not be made, although privacy
should still be protected to the extent feasible and appropriate given
the particular project. Finally, individual respect and autonomy re-
quire that subjects be permitted to consent, within limits, to both
known and unknown risks, provided such consent reflects the sub-
194 This Article does not purport to address research involving children as
subjects. See John A. Robertson, The $1000 Genome: Ethical and Legal Issues in
Whole Genome Sequencing of Individuals, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1 (2003),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/jrobertson/1000genome.pdf.
195 See, e.g., BELMONT REPORT, supra note 54 (researchers must have respect
for the autonomy of persons and protect persons with diminished autonomy).
' Id.
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ject's considered judgment, in the face of all reasonably available
information, and does not pose an unacceptable risk to others.' 9 7
In the case of public genomics research, respect for autonomy is
evidenced through the development of robust informed consent pro-
cedures and through the diligent efforts of researchers and participants
alike to ensure that the agreements that embody such informed proce-
dures are living documents, constantly under scrutiny to ensure that
they produce the most informed consent possible. To reach the ideals
set forth in the Belmont Report, researchers must devote considerable
time and energy to self-regulation, including the consent process, to
the point that such ethical, legal, and social considerations command a
meaningful part of the resources of any truly responsible public ge-
nomics research project. 98
No matter how robust, however, self-regulation and self-reflection
can only take public genomics so far. To truly enable responsible
public genomics, legal and regulatory regimes must be modified so
that the risks of public genomics to participants, as well as to re-
searchers, are reduced even as they are fully disclosed.
B. Respect for Researchers
We start from the principle that the vast majority of public ge-
nomics researchers - both those that conduct the research and those
that approve it - do so with the sincere desire to protect the subjects of
their research, and that they act diligently and in good faith to do so.
This principle reflects the practical recognition that, if the structures
regulating public genomics research were to be crafted on any as-
sumption other than good faith, the strictures would need to be so
tight and pervasive that much beneficial research would never see the
light of day.
If we assume the general good faith of researchers - including the
IRBs and other institutional structuresl99 that approve and oversee
197 See id. ("To respect autonomy is to give weight to autonomous persons'
considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their actions unless
they are clearly detrimental to others. To show lack of respect for an autonomous
agent is to repudiate that person's considered judgments, to deny an individual the
freedom to act on those considered judgments . . . .").
198 The Human Genome Project recognized the importance of devoting re-
sources to the consideration of the ethical, legal and social issues associated with
genomic research. The ELSI Research Program, a legacy of the original Human
Genome Project, continues to devote substantial resources to this topic today. See
Nat'l Human Genome Research Inst., Nat'l Insts. of Health, ELSI Planning and Eval-
uation History, http://www.genome.gov/10001754 (last visited May 3, 2010).
19 For instance, the independent DSMB in the case of the PGP. See PGP
CONSENT FORM, supra note 90, at § VH1(L.6).
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their work - two of the best ways to balance competing principles are
(i) to ask how researchers in practice have been balancing and propos-
ing to balance those principles, and (ii) within broad limits, to permit
researchers the flexibility to determine the best balance in the context
of their own research. This does not mean that researchers should
operate without formal limits but that those limits should be drawn to
provide specific researchers, and public genomics as a field, with the
flexibility they need to adapt participant protections in the manner
that is best suited to the changing landscape of public genomics. The
Helsinki Principles and the Common Rule each present a set of broad
guidelines within which practitioners can apply their informed, good
faith judgment in support of broad, agreed-upon principles rather than
in compliance with undifferentiated restrictions.
C. Respect for Common Law
This article has identified the risks of lawsuits for negligence or
malpractice that might be brought against public genomics research-
ers, primarily in the fifty state courts. In one sense, this possibility
seems a nightmare scenario for researchers in new fields of know-
ledge, particularly one as intimately connected to human health as
genomics. As recognized herein, a research institution and individual
researchers could find themselves defending actions that, with the
greater knowledge of hindsight (possibly derived from the very re-
search being challenged), presented greater than anticipated risks to
participants. As a practical matter, however, absent comprehensively
preemptive federal regulation - which is unlikely to meet with a fa-
vorable response in the current political and legal climate - such risk
is unavoidable. Not only that, it is also beneficial.
The common law of torts embodies a rich history of both reflect-
ing and leading the development and articulation of the duties that
members of society owe each other, and of adapting - albeit gradually
- to changes in technology and moral sensibilities. A research com-
munity that takes its ethical obligations seriously, diligently pursues
self-regulation, and ultimately formalizes and instantiates those ethical
obligations in regulatory form will shape over time, for appropriate
reasons and in appropriate ways, the common law's understanding of
research duties in the context of public genomics. Being tested, some-
times to failure, by the application of evolving common law duties
will provide a powerful corrective when individuals, or the research
community as a whole, strays too far from its recognized ethical, le-
gal, and social obligations. In other words, judicial oversight is both
inevitable and necessary.
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D. Ensure that Regulation is Focused and Informed
This article has reviewed the existing framework of federal and
state statutes and regulations and found it lacking along several di-
mensions. This should come as no surprise. Positive law struggles
whenever knowledge expands because yesterday offers less
understanding of tomorrow, and laws that attempt to address future
technologies - as in the case with genomic sequencing and interpreta-
tion - suffer even more acutely the burden of unintended conse-
quences.
Because regulation is an inevitable response to technological ad-
vancement, however, the genomics community should work diligently
and cooperatively to ensure that an emerging regulatory framework
incorporates certain fundamental distinctions where applicable. For
instance, to the extent feasible, the clinical practice of medicine
should be clearly and unmistakably distinguished from basic scientific
research. This distinction becomes even more important in a field
such as genomics, where the raw data of research has unavoidable
clinical significance. Researchers need to know which methods or
models are acceptable - especially how they can and cannot interact
with their participants - without being subject to regulation for prac-
ticing medicine, an activity in which they neither qualify nor intend to
engage.
Especially within the realm of public genomics, formal regulation
must also recognize challenges to traditional notions of participant
privacy protection and permit - where consistent with underlying re-
search goals and coupled with sufficiently informed and freely given
consent - the public disclosure and use of personal genotypic, pheno-
typic, and other information. Thorough and responsible self-
regulation on the part of the public genomics community in advance
of the inevitable formal regulation will provide a blueprint for future
lawmakers and regulators and ensure that such regulation is both cog-
nizant of and informed by existing public genomics research.
E. Establish a Forum for Consolidating Information and
Guidance on Best Practices
The federal regulatory scheme should include an expanded regu-
latory forum or oversight body that consolidates information and
expertise on public genomics best practices. This Article takes no
position regarding where such consolidation should occur, and does
not consider consolidation a replacement for the core missions of ex-
isting federal agencies, such as the mission of the FDA to ensure the
safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, biologics, and medical devic-
es. The writ of such organization should include all public genomics
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research conducted in the United States (with attention paid to interna-
tional efforts), and it should have as its objective providing both in-
formation and guidelines on the development of responsible public
genomics.
This Article does not propose that such agency promulgate a
comprehensive set of research regulations, which would risk produc-
ing the sort of rigid "one size fits all" approach that characterizes
existing laws and regulations. Rather, this agency would provide in-
formation and guidance to: (i) permit research institutions, researchers
and other stakeholders, acting in good faith, to collaborate in the de-
sign and implementation of responsible, effective research protocols;
(ii) allow research participants access to data regarding the risks and
benefits of research projects; and (iii) provide courts with a standard
to follow when formulating common duties and standards of care.
Although one purpose of such an organization would be to try to re-
duce the incentive of states to enact overlapping regulatory schemes,
to the extent states do put such schemes in place, the existence of a
comprehensive source of information and guidance may at least in-
form such schemes for the better and encourage consistency in regula-
tory aims and implementation.
F. Ongoing Review and Re-Appraisal
Finally, any public genomics regulatory framework should pro-
vide the means for all of the applicable stakeholders in this field -
researchers and research participants, educators, policymakers and
regulators, public and private clinical care providers, and commercial
genonic service providers - with the opportunity to measure, public-
ize, and assess on a continuing basis the effectiveness of existing ethi-
cal, legal, and social practices in the field of public genomics research.
The dialogue should permit public as well as industry and regula-
tory voices, and the institutional structures should be biased toward a
flexible, guidelines-based regime (rather than a more rigid rules-based
approach) so that researchers can continue to achieve the best balance
between conducting desirable, responsible research and protecting the
well-being and autonomy of research participants. Many of these
goals may be achieved by expanding upon the existing government
genomics advisory and oversight framework including, for example,
the Secretary's Advisory Committee for Genetics, Health, and Society
(SACGHS). 2 00
200 The SACGHS "advises the Secretary of Health and Human Services on
the broad range of human health and societal issues raised by the development and
use and potential misuse of genetic technologies" and is already relatively interdiscip-
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CONCLUSION
The public genomics era is arriving rapidly and carries with it
great promise for the progress of scientific knowledge and human
health. Nevertheless, the era is developing gradually enough that po-
licymakers, regulators, and researchers have no excuse for failing to
develop a structural framework adequate to the demands of public
genomics and designed to promote its continued development. All
who would participate in or benefit from a future of public genomics
research have a shared responsibility to contribute to that process, for
to do nothing would jeopardize the future of responsible public ge-
nomics.
linary in nature. Office of Sci. Policy, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Secretary's Advisory
Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS), http://oba.od.nih.gov/
sacghs/sacghs home.html (last visited May 3, 2010); Office of Sci. Policy, Nat'l
Insts. of Health, SACGHS Member Roster, http://oba.od.nih.gov/SACGHS/sacghs
members.html (last visited May 3, 2010). However, SACGHS is limited to serving
the needs of HHS, and even in that capacity its advisory authority is limited. Expand-
ing its focus and/or authority, perhaps through partnerships with other agencies and
public genomics stakeholders, would be highly desirable.
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